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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
Where there is no dispute between parties as to the facts, or amount of claim,
a receipt of less than full amount does not constitute an accord and satisfac-
tion. Beardsley v. Davis, 377.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT. See DEED, 2.
ACTION. See ESTOPPEL, 2 ; LIMITATIONSi 2; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 17;
WASTE.
1. Will lie against conveyancer for error in judgment, and rule of liability
is the same as in the case of lawyers and physicians. Watson v. Afuirhead, 310.
2. Will not lie to compel one to render an account and to re-convey real
estate, which he holds under a conveyance made to defraud creditors. Sweet
v. Tinslar, 438.
ACTS OF CONGRESS.
1839, Feb. 28. See CouRTs, 15.
1845, Feb. 26. See INTERNAL REVENUE.
1850, July 29. See VESSELS, 2.
1852, August 30. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 18.
1855, Feb. 10. See ALIEN, 1.
1855, March 6. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 18.
1861, July 13. See INTERNATIONAL, LAW 12, 17.
1862, - - See CONFEDERATE STATES, 5.
1862, Feb. 25. See LEGAL TENDER NOTES, 2.
1863, March 3. See COURTS, 15.
1864, June 11. See CoNGRESs.
1864, June 30. See STAmrS, 6.
1865, Feb. See TAXATION, 2.
1867, Feb. 5. See TAXATION.
1867, March 2. See BANKRUTCY, 1.
ADMINISTRATOR. See EXECUTOR.
ADMAIRALTY. See CommoN CARRIER, 9.
1. A cause of action to be cognisable in admiralty must relate to the busf-
ness of commerce and navigation. People v. Steamer Anerica, 182.
2. A state pilot law, enacting that all vessels shall take a pilot, but con-
taining no clause exempting the vessels from liability for the pilot's misman-
agement, does not protect a vessel, with a pilot on board, from liability for
torts done by it, though such torts are, the result of the pilot's negligence.
The China, 437.
3. State statutes authorizing actions in rem against vessels for causes cog-
nisable in admiralty are statutes conferring admiralty jurisdiction, and are
therefore unconstitutional. Jackson v. Steamer Kinnie, 470.
4. A lien created by a state law against a domestic vessel for supplies fur-





5. Where in case of collision, there is reasonable doubt as to which vessel
is to blame, the loss must be sustained by the one on which it has fallen. 7he
Grace Girdle, 438.
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENCE. See PRACTICE, 3.
AGENT. See BAILMENT, 2; BROKER, 1, 3; DAMAGES, 7; STATUTE OF
FRAUDS, 5; INSURANCE, 9; INTERNATIONAL LAW, 10; VENDOR AND
PURCHASER, 13.
1. A local board of directors, established by a foreign corporation in New
York, under regulations of the statute of that state, no matter how complete
its organization or how full its authority to transact business without consulta-
tion with its principal, is still a mere agency, and not a distinct corporation.
Robinson v. Life Assurance Co., 166.
2. Therefore a contract, as of insurance, made by this New York board
with the plaintiff, a citizen of Virginia, was the contract of the foreign cor-
poration with plaintiff, and the government of the foreign corporation being
a neutral and having recognised the government of the plaintiff as a be-
lligerent, the contract was not suspended by the civil war in America, and
payment of premiums to a sub-agent of the corporation, at Richmond, was a
valid payment to the corporation. Id.
3. A party dealing with an agent for a special purpose must ascertain at
his own peril the agent's power. The National Iron Co. v. Bruner, 244.
4. An agent with restricted power to sell land at a given price, cannot
bind his principal, by representations as to quantity or quality. Id.
5. The fact that an instrument is made payable at a bank does not make
the bank an agent of payee to receive payment, unless be actually deposits
the instrument there, or in some express manner authorizes the bank to act
for him. Ward v. Smith, 354.
6. When an instrument is lodged with a bank for collection, the bank
becomes the agent of the payee or obligee to receive payment. The agency
extends no further, and without special authority an agent can only receive
payment of the debt due his principal in the legal currency of the country, or
in bills which pass as money at their par value by the common consent of the
community. .d.
7. Authority to receive payment implies authority to receive it in whatever
was regarded as money at the time and place of payment. Confederate notes
being so regarded and being received in good faith by the agent were a valid
medium of payment, as between the plaintiff and the corporation. Id.
8. Accepting employment hostile to the interests of his employer, is guilty
of breach of contract and may be discharged therefor. Morrison v. Ogdens-
burgh 6- Champlain Railroad, 382..
AGREEMENT. See ATTORNEY, 1 ; STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 1-6; INTEREST, 1.
It is not necessary to constitute an agreement that a proposition made by
letter should be accepted expressly, it is sufficient if acted upon and complied
with. Bearddey v. Davis, 377.
ALIEN.
1. The Act of Congress of February 10th 1855, which declares "that any
woman, who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married,
or who shall be married to a citizen of the United.States, shall be deemed
and taken to be a citizen," confers the privileges of citizenship upon women
married to citizens of the United States, if they are of the class of persons for
whose naturalization the previous Acts of Congress provide. Kelly v. Owen
et al., 444.
2. The'terms "married" or "1who shall be married," in the act, do not
refer to the time when the ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to the state
of marriage. Id.
3. The citizenship of the husband wherever it exists, confers citizenship on
the wife. Id.
4. Any woman being a free white person, and an alien friend, married
after the approval of the Act of February 10th 1855, to a man who was, at the
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time of such marriage, a naturalized citizen of the United States, becomes, by
such marriage, ipsofacto, herself a citizen of the United States, and capable
of inheriting real estate, although she resided in a foreign country at the time
of her said marriage, and has continued her actual residence there ever since.
Kane v. hfcCarthy, 482.
5. And any alien woman answering the above description, and married
before the approval of the said act, to an alien husband, who has been subse-
quently naturalized, becomes by his naturalization, ipsofacto, herself a citizen
of the United States, and capable of inheriting real estate. Id.
6. It is the status of being married to-being the wife of-a citizen, which
makes the alien woman a citizen of the United States. Id.
AMENDMENT. '
To a writ which changes the names of the parties to the action, not allowa-
ble. Lewis v. Locke, 501.
ARBITRATION.1. An Act of Congress referring a claim to an officer of one of the executive
departments to examine and adjust, is not such an arbitrament and award in
the technical sense, as to bind the parties like a submission. Gordon v. United
,States, 244.
2. Hence a subsequent act repealing the one making the reference, impairs
no right and is valid. Id.
3. A mere submission to arbitration will not be necessarily a discontinuance
of a pending suit. Lary v. Goodeno, 568.
ARMY. See MILITARY SERVICE.
ASSIGNMENT. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 7.
The delivery of a promissory note payable to bearer is an assignment of it.
Cox's Executors v. Matthews, 510.
ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. See BANKRUPTCY, 11-
14.
ASSUISPSIT. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 5.
1. Lies to recover plaintiff's share, on an agreement between plaintiff and
defendant to sell real estate and divide profits. Bruce v. Hastings, 506.
2. A school district may maintain an action for money had and received,
against a school committee who have neglected to appropriate money in their
hands as directed. School District No. 7 in Auburn v. Sherburne, 568.
3. Lies to recover money advanced to a corporation for shares of its capital
stock. Swazey v. Choate Manufacturing Co., 569.
4. An action of assumpsit may be brought against a city or town to recover
a reward offered for the apprehension of a criminal. Tanurin v. Town of
Exeter, 570.
5. Will not lie to recover money voluntarily paid with full knowledge of
the facts. Lester v. The Mayor, 695.
6. Where a party who has contracted to purchase an interest in certain oil-
wells, transfers his interest to an oil company afterwards incorporated, and
the deed is made directly to such company by the vendors, the company
may maintain assumpsit for the oil received by the vendors, between the date
of the contract and the incorporation. Snow v. Thompson Oil Co., 753.
ATTACHMENT. SeaPRACTICE, 2.
1. In Illinois, an attachment on personal property, takes precedence of an
unrecorded mortgage. Green v. VTan Buskirk, 246.
2. An attachment once dismissed loses its priority, even though re-instated
by consent of the defendant. Murphy v. Bruce, 308.
3. Judgment cannot be rendered against a garnishee, where his contract is
to pay the defendant in attachment, in property. Weil v. Tyler, 378.
4. An attachment, under which goods have been seized, which is set aside
for irregularity, afflords no protection to the plaintiffs. Lyon v. Yates, 379.
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1. An agreement made in the presence of an attorney between his client
and a third person, is not a privileged communication. Carr v. Weld, 244.
2. An attorney's license is primfacie evidence of his authority, to appear
for any one, but if denied he must furnish evidence of his retainer. Clark v.
Wilett, 501.
3. An attorney at law has no authority as such to sell or assign the claim
of his client. Rowland v. Slate and Moyer, 632.
AWARD. See AansBiT TioN.
BAGGAGE. See Commox CAnniER, 1, 6.
BAILMENT.
1. Where a bailee of goods absolutely renses to deliver them to the owner,
on demand; or assumes to be himself the owner; or interposes an unrea-
sonable objection to delivering them ; or exhibits bad faith in regard to the
transaction; a conversion of the property may be inferred. Carroll v. Mix,
59.
2. An agent cannot pledge or mortgage goods, to secure an advance on his
own account. First Jational Bank of Macon v. Ndson, 309.
5. Warehousemen and forwarders are responsible for the proper custody
and storage of goods in their charge, and are bound to use ordinary care and
diligence in their protection. B. 4- 0. -R. R. Co. v. Schumacher, 699.
BANK. See AGENT, 4, 5; LIMITATIONS,.4; STOCK, 1.
1. A national banking association organized from a state bank and receiving
its assets, is liable for its debt. Thorp v. Megefaith, 62.
2. After a national association had become insolvent, its debtor could not
purchase notes for which it was liable, to set-off against his debt. Id.
3. A bank cannot avail itself of the neglect of a third person to prevent the
recovery by one to whom it has paid out a spurious note. Burrill v. Water-
town Bank and Loan Co., 183.
4. A bank having received $3000, in gold coin of the United States, as a
special deposit, will be compelled to return to the depositor the amount of coin,
in specie, with interest thereon in specie, from the time of demand. Chesa-
peake Bank v. Swain, 754.
BANKRUPTCY.
I. Jurisdiction.
1. The Bankrupt Act does not absolutely and totally suspend or abrogate
state insolvent laws. Hawkins' Appeal, 205.
2. A voluntary assignment by a debtor, good at common law and made in
the form prescribed by the insolvent law of the state, held valid, although the
United States Bankrupt Act was in existence and applicable to the case at the
time of the assignment. Id.
3. And the proceedings of the probate court in administering upon the in-
solvent estate so assigned held valid. Id.
4. Where there is no conflict of jurisdiction between the officers of the state
courts and the Court of Bankruptcy, the latter will not interfere. Re David-
son, 236.
5. Discharge refused for want of jurisdiction,, where the bankrupt was
member of a firm in New Jersey, hut had also an office in New York where
lie received and wrote his letters. Re Little, 236.
6. District Court has no power by injunction, to stay proceedings in another
court by reason of bankruptcy proceedings pending in another state. In re
Richardson, 236.
7. The appellate jurisdiction, properly so called, of the Circuit Court in
bankruptcy matters is limited to controversies between assignees and the
claimants of adverse interests, and between assignees and creditor-claimants
respecting the allowance of claims. In re Alexander,'423.
8. The supervisory jurisdiction of the Cicuit Court includes all decisions of
the District Court, or the district judge at chambers, which cannot be reviewed
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by appeal or writ of error under the appellate jurisdiction given by the 8th
section. In re Alexander, 423.
9. An appeal must be taken in the time and manner prescribed by the act.
The regulations as to appeals are regulations of jurisdiction, and cannot be
enlarged or restricted by the Circuit or District Courts. Id.
10. The Circuit Court under the 2d section of the Bankrupt Act has juris-
diction to revise the rulings and judgment of the District Court in proceedings
in bankruptcy upon bill filed. Langley T. Perry, 427.
II. Acts of Bankruptcy. See post, 25, 27.
11. Assignment by an insolvent of all his property, for benefit of preferred
creditors, is an act of bankruptcy. Grow v. Ballard, 237.
12. Suspension of payment of commerciallpaper for fourteen days, and un-
explaifd, act of bankruptcy. Re Ballard, 237.
13. Non-payment of promissory notes at maturity, which are not commer-
cial paper, no ground for adjudication of bankruptcy. Re Lowenstein, 237.
14. A general assignment of all a debtor's property for the benefit of his
creditors, is not necessarily a conveyance with intent to delay, defraud, or
hinder creditors. Langley v. Perry, 427.
15. And where such an assignment is made with intent to secure an equal
distribution of all the debtor's property among all his creditors, it is not neces-
sarily a conveyance of property with intent to defeat or delay the operation of
the Bankrupt Act. id.
16. To make such an assignment an act of bankruptcy, it must be made
with intent to delay, defraud, or hinder creditors within the meaning of the
statute of 13 Elizabeth, or with intent to defeat or delay the operation of the
Bankrupt Act. Id.
I. Elect of the Institution of Proceedings.
17. Property of bankrupt after filing petition cannot be taken in execution.
Re Wallace, 237.
18. Property of bankrupt exempt by state and bankrupt law, though levied
on by United States marsbal, cannot be sold after filing petition. Re Griffln,
237.
19. When attachment is dissolved by commencement of proceedings in
oankruptcy, the title of the property vests in assignee. Re Houseberger, 237.
20. Vendor's equitable lien upheld by Court of Bankruptcy. Re Perdue,
237.
21. Judgment-creditors may issue execution and sell their debtor's property.
Re Ken, 237.
22. Bankrupts before appointment of assignee cannot be purchasers of the
estate. March v. Heaton, 238.
23. Feme covert trader may avail herself of her coverture to defeat debts in
bankruptcy, unless she has conformed to statutes governing such traders. Re
Slichter, 238.
24. While adjudication of bankruptcy stands unrevoked, inquiry into valid-
ity of petitioning creditor's debt is precluded. Re Fallon, 238.
IV. Practice. See post, 40, 57, 74.
25. Where A. being indebted to B. and before insolvency, sold the latter
an estate, and credited him on his books with the amount of such indebtedness,
and after insolvency in a settlement with B. deducted the amount of such
indebtedness from the purchase-money: it was held that the payment was
really made at the time of sale, that it was a legitimate transaction, and not
a fraudulent preference within the meaning of the Bankrupt Act. Re Isaac
Rosenfdd, Jr., 44. -
26. Where specification charges that a particular debt was paid after the
passage of the Bankrupt Act, proof is inadmissible tlint other debts were paid
after the passage of said act, but not the particular debt specified. Id.
27. Insurance made upon house and furniture in pursuance of covenants in
lease, is not a fraudulent preference. Id.
28. Bankrupt not liable to arrest for a claim that would be discharged by
an adjudication of bankruptcy. Re Kimball, 236.
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29. Original papers referred to in deposition and annexed thereto, cannot
be withdrawn from the files. Re McMain, 238.
30. Creditor may petition court to be paid a judgment out of funds in hands
of assignee. Re Smith, 238.
31. Two or more partners may be adjudged bankrupts upon the petition of
one or more of them. Re Crockett, 238.
32. Omission to publish notice of meeting in one of the papers designated,
also failure to state in warrant the names, residences, and amount of debts,
sufficient irregularity to set aside proceedings. Re Hall, 238.
33. Bankrupt may be called upon at any time to submit to an examination.
Re McBrien, 238.
34. Order for examination always made on petition for final discharge, by
the court; other examinations must be on petition of assignee or creditors.
Re Brandt, 238-239.
35. Creditor must apply by petition or affidavit for order to examine
bankrupt under section 26. Re Adams, 239.
36. Each creditor, may examine under section 26, bat examination regu-
lated by register. Id.
37. Bankrupt must answer questions relating to property in which he might
have an interest. Re Bonested, 239.
V. Discharqe.
38. Expenditures incurred by bankrupt while insolvent in support of his
family, in the absence of evidence as to their character is no ground for re-
fusal of discharge. Re Isaac Rosenfeld, 44.
39. Servants' wages paid after passage of Bankrupt Act, as necessary fam-
ily expenses, and payments made to counsel for services "rendered and to
be rendered," when made without fraud, are no grounds for refusal of discharge.
Id.
40. Petition to have decision of District Court refusing discharge on ac-
count of fraud, reviewed, denied. Be Robinson, 236.
41. Must be applied for within one year of adjudicaton. Re Willmott, 239.
42. Under section 29, it is only where bankrupt can apply for his discharge
in less than six months, that he must within a year. Be Greenfield, 239.
43. Will not be refused for omission of names of creditors from schedule
with their consent and knowledge. Re Needham, 239.
44. Refused where bankrupt swore falsely that he had no assets. Re Rath-
bone, 239.
45. Creditor secured by deed of trust of land, must proceed according to
rule, in opposing discharge. Re McVey, 241.
46. The concealment of bankrupt's effects, or a false affidavit to the inven-
tory, must be shown to be intentional, in order to preclude discharge. Re
W att, 239.
47. Refused where the proof of fraudulent concealment of property was not
overborne by positive testimony. Re Goodridge, 239.
48. Payment of attorney's fees is not such a preference as will prevent dis-
charge of bankrupt. Re Sidle, 240.
49. Assignment of a claim, made to secure pre-existing indebtedness and
when bankrupt was insolvent, is ground for refusing discharge. Re Foster,
240.
.50. Payment of one creditor in full by person not contemplating bankruptcy,
will not prevent discharge. Re Locke, 240.
51. The bare denial of bankrupt, insufficient to show that assignment was
not made in contemplation of bankruptcy. Re Broadhead, 240.
52. Refused, on failure to keep books of account whether with fraudulent
intent or not. Id.
53. The intent of non-keeping of books immaterial. Re Newman, 240.
54. Vague and general specifications of -fraud not allowed in opposition to
discharge. Re Hansen, 240.
55. Opposition to discharge on the ground of debt being fraudulently
created, insufficient. Re Doody, 240.
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56. Will not be withheld on the ground that debts were contracted in a
fiduciary character. Re Tracey, 241.
57. Specifications in opposition to discharge may be filed nunc pro tunc, in
proper cases. Re Grefe, 241.
58. Creditors not having proved their debts may oppose. Be Boutelle, 241.
59. A surety on an appeal bond is no longer liable, where the principal is
discharged in bankruptcy. Odell v. Wooten, 318.
VI. Property exempted. See post, 61.
60. Under the provision of the 14th section of the Bankrupt Law of 2d
March 1867, excepting from the operation of the act the property of debtors
exempted from levy and sale by the laws of the state, a vested expectant inter-
est of a bankrupt in a sum of money payable at his own death, or at the death
of another person, may, in Pennsylvania, be set apart for the use of the bank-
rupt; so, however, that its appraised present value, estimated as in cases of
life insurance, does not exceed $300, or that the bankrupt does not receive
more than $300, if the value thus estimated exceeds that amount. Bennett's
Case, 34.
VII. Rights and Duties of Assignee. See ante, 19.
6L Real estate cannot be allotted or set apart by the assignee to a bank-
rupt under section 14 of the Bankrupt Act, even though the personal property,
excluiding the articles exempted by the state law, be less than the amount
which the assignee thinks should be allowed the defendant. Matter of Thiorn-
ton, 42.
62. Money may be so allotted to the bankrupt. Id.
63. Judge cannot interfere, where assignee is chosen by the greater part in
number and value of creditors. Re Grant, 241.
64. Court will not sanction solicitation of votes for assignee. Re -,
241.
65. Register can convey estate to assignee where there is no "opposing
interest." In re Wylie, 241.
66. Property fraudulently disposed of may be recovered by assignee in
summary manner. Neall v. Beckwith, 241.
67. Cannot recover property from creditor in an action of trover unless
fraud in the transfer be shown. Wadsworth v. Tyler, 242.
68. A chattel mortgage executed by one co-partner under seal, and assented
to by the other by parol, is valid. Hawkins v. Bank, 242.
VIII. Proof of Debts.
69. A judgment for a fine imposed as a penaltyfor crime is not a debt within
the meaning of the Bankrupt Act, and not being included in the special pro-
visions allowing certain claims to be proved as debts, it cannot be proved
against the estate of a bankrupt. Matter of Sutherland, 39.
70. A creditor of a bankrupt holding a mortgage as security for his debt,
must prove his debt, and then apply to court to have security sold. Re Bittell,
242.
71. A debt created by fraud is provable. Re Rundle, 242.
72. A judgment obtained on breach of promise to marry is a debt provable,
and is barred by discharge. Re Sidel, 242.
73. Judgment obtained after adjudication of bankruptcy is not provable
against estate of bankrupt. Re Williams, 242.
74. Action to recover provable debt must be stayed until discharge is deter-
mined on. Re Rosenberg, 242.
IX. Distribution.
75. A state court cannot interfere with the distribution of bankrupt's assets.
Re Bridgman, 243.
76. The obligee of a joint and several bond of members of a co-partnersbip,
is entitled to dividends out of the assets of the individual bankrupt members
of the firm. Re Bigelow, 243.
X. Rpgister. See ante, 65.
77. Mu't certify conformity or non-conformity on presentation to him by
bankrupt. ..f oath required by section 29. Re Pulver, 241.
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78. May fill up blank, issue summons, &c., and proceed the same as the
judge when there is no controversy. Re Brandt, 243.
79. Has power to order the payment of fees and expenses out of funds in
the hands of assignee. Re Lane, 243.
1 80. Must exercise proper legal discretion to prevent unnecessary and unrea-
sonable delays. Re Hyman, 243.
XI. Costs.
81. Compensation of counsel for petitioning creditors in involuntary bank-
ruptcy, is taxable as part of the costs of the proceedings, and payable out of
the fund realized. Matter of O'Hara, 113.
82. But the principle does not extend to give petitioning creditors a right
to contribution from the other creditors in case of failure to realize a sufficient
fund to pay expenses and counsel fees. Id.
83. Bankrupt summoned by creditor as a witness is not entitled to witness
fees. Re McNair, 243.
84. Party for whom services are performed by the officers of the court,
must pay the fees incident to such services. Be JMealy, 243.
85. Travel by United States marshal as messenger to make return, is
necessary, and five cents a mile is proper charge therefor. Re Talbot, 243.
86. Charge of ten cents per folio for preparing notices is not proper. Id.
87. An item for attendance is improper charge. Id.
BILLS AND NOTES. See ASSIGNMENT; CsrECK, 1 ; EVIDENCE, 13; ExE-
CUTioN, 7; INTERNATIONAL LAw, 8; STAsPS, 2-4-6; SURETY, 4.
I. Rights and Liabilities of Parties.
1. The law of the place, where note stipulating for payment of interest is
made, will govern as to rate and rule of casting interest thereon. Chase v.
Dow, 59.
2. A note payable on demand, and negotiated ten months after it was exe-
cuted, is subject to the equities of the original parties, in the hands of an
innocent holder. Morey v. Wakefield, 510.
3. A note due one day after date, with an agreement in writing that the
obligees in the note shall have five years to pay it in, cannot be sued on until
the expiration of the time, and the Statute of Limitations will not begin to run
until then. Round v. Donnell, 575.
4. Guaranty of a note, not distinguishable from a general letter of credit,
and suit may be maintained in name of person given credit on its faith.
Northumberland Bk. v. Eyer, 630.
5. A guaranty is not assignable so as to enable the assignee to sue on it in
his own name. Id.
6. B. made a note payable to J. S. endorsed it: afterwards J. endorsed.
it and it was discounted by a bank for J. Held, that S. was not liable either
to the bank or to J. without evidence dehors that he had assumed the liability.
Schafer v. Farmers' 4- Mechanics' Bank, 684.
7. The mere endorsement in such case did not authorize the holder to write
a guaranty over it, but a special original agreement might be established by
proof. Id.
8. The payee, who was also an endorser, was incompetent to testify to
such a special agreement of the irregular endorser. Id.
9. The endorsement is not a note in writing, as required by the Act of April
'26th 1855 (Frauds). -i.
10. The proof of a collateral liability for the debt of the maker different
from that which the endorsement imports cannot be made by parol. Id.
II. Demand and Notice.
11. Any act of endorser tending to put holder of note off his guard, is in
law a waiver of demand and notice. Sheldon v. Horton, 575.
12. Notice of dishonour left at post office where there is daily delivery suf-
ficient. Shoemaker v. iechanics' Bank, 693.
B )ND. See PARTNERSHlP, 4 ; STAMrs, 5.
Recovery on bond assigned as collateral security, for amount less than face
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of bond does not satisfy and extinguish the bond as againit the obligee.
Brumagin v. Chew, 125:
BOUNTY. See PARENT AND CHILD, 2.
1. The right of a person who has enlisted, on a promise to be paid such
bounty as a town may vote, cannot be defeated by a subsequent vote to rescind.
Haven v. Town of Ludlow, 502.
2. A commissioned officer is not entitled to bounty. Hilliard v. Stewarts-
town, 569.
BRIDGE. See NEGLIGENCE, 1-2.
BROKER.
1. An agent employed to sell goods on commission is a mere broker, and
as such is authorized to make contracts for the sale and delivery, but cannot
make them in his own name nor receive payment therefor. Dunn v. Wright,
59.
2. Can sign contract of sale. Pringle v. Spaulding, 569.
3. Where an agent is interested as for commissions as a factor or broker,
and a contract is made in his name, he may maintain an action on it in his own
name.' Tdegraph Co. v. Gildersleve, 692.
4. Wliere a broker sent by telegraph, in his name, an order for the purchase
of gold on behalf of his principal, which was never transmitted, he may sue in
his own name and recover the full amount of damages resulting from the
breach of contract. Id.
5. Is only entitled to commissions when the purchase is completed as
agreed on. Kimberly v. Henderson, 754.
CASES APPROVED, OVERRULED, &c.
Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. R. 532, confirmed. Todd v. Austin, 9.
Flowers v. Todd, 6 Hill 340, questioned. Burrill v. Watertown Bank,
183.
De Groot v. United States, 5 Wall. 432, affirmed. Gordon v. United
States, 244.
Taylor v. McCune, 1 Jones 460, remarked on. Schafer v. F. 4. M. Bank,
684.
.Keyner v. Shower, 1 Harris 446, commented on. Schafer v. F. 6 -M. Bank,
684.
Commonwealth v. Shelby, 13 S. & R. 354, explained. Okeson's Appeal,
703.
English v. Harvey, 2 Rawle 309, explained. Okeson's Appeal, 703.
Leese v. Clarke, 29 Cal. 672, commented on. Mayne v. Jones, 120.
Ryan v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 11 Harris 384, remarked on. O'Don-
nell v. Allegheny R. 'R., 757.
CANAL. See VENDOR AND PudxCnASER, 4.
CANAL-BOAT. See MORTGAGE, 3.
CHECK. See PAYMENT, 2.
1. Received in payment of a draft, if not paid, will not make the draft in-
valid as an obligation. Kelty v. National Bank of Eri, 438.
2. Is subject to the same rule as draft, as to time of presentment. Id.
CHARITABLE USES. See WILL, 2.
The object of the statute of charitable uses in England was not to restrain
gifts to such uses, but to enforce and make valid such gifts in certain cases in
which they had before been held void because the object was too vague and in-
definite. Norris et al. v. Thompson's Ex'rs. et al., 244.
CHURCH. See EASEMENT, 1-3.
CITIZEN. See INTERNATIONAL LAW, 11; NUISANCE, 1.
COIN. See LEGAL TENDER NOTES, 2-3; BANK, 4.
1. Gold paid into Court, on a conditional verdict in ejectment, prior to the
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Legal Tender Law, cannot be recovered in an action of trover subsequently
to the passage of the Law. Aurentz v. Porter, 61.
2. The clause in the Act of Congress of February 25th 1862, and two sub-
sequent acts, making notes of United States a legal tender for debts, has no
.reference to taxes imposed by state authority. Lane County v. Oregon, 251.
3. A contract to pay in gold and silver coin is a contract to deliver a cer-
tain weight of gold and silver. Butler v. Horwitz, 443.
4. Where it appears to be the clear intent of a contract that payment is to
be made in gold or silver, damages should be assessed in coin, and judgment
entered accordingly. Id.
5. Whether the Legal Tender Acts of Congress be constitutional or other-
wise, a contract which provides for payment in coin, may be enforced in
conformity with its stipulations, and judgment may be rendered for the
amount in coin, and the same enforced by execution, on which coin only shall
be collected. Chesapeake Bank v. Swain, 754.
COMMON CARRIER. See RAILROAD, 10.
1. The responsibility of 'an express company is the same as that of a car-
rier, and it cannot exempt itself from liability for loss from negligence, by
an exception in a receipt. Belger v. Dinsmore, 185.
2. The owners of a steamboat, employed in towing boats for hire, are not
common carriers and hence not insurers. Wooden v. Austin, 189.
3. Parties undertaking to tow a boat from one place to another are bound
to do so, unless prevented by causes to which at least gross negligence on
their part does not contribute. Id.
4. Will not be liable for breach of contract to tow a vessel, where he was
prevented by the freezing of the river, that being an act of God. Worth v.
Edmonds, 308.
5. One transportation company, receiving freight from another, is entitled
to the benefit of all stipulations affecting its liability made by the latter with
the owner. Manhattan Oil Co. v. Camden and Amboy Railroad, 309.
6. The holder of a railway passenger ticket is only entitled to passage with
such personal baggage as he carries with him at the time. Baggage sent by
an after train will be at his risk, and not that of the company. Wilson Y.
Railway Co., 398.
7. Of passengers is bound to exercise the very highest degree of care and
diligence, and liable for the smallest negligence. Taylor v. Grand Trunk
Railway, 575.
8. Where goods were delivered to one company in a connected line of trans-
portation, dividing the freight according to their respective services, and were
described in the bill of lading, as received by the company to whom delivered
and to be transported throughout the line, that company was held responsible
for any damage occurring upon any portion of the line, on the ground of an
implied contract to deliver safely at the end of the route. Aforse v. Brainerd,
604.
9. A steamboat towing three loaded barges down the Mississippi river, in
approaching bridge piers too closely to back or stop, the tow is driven against
a pier by a sudden and unanticipated gust of wind: the carrier is not liable
for loss or injury of the cargo of one of the barges. Insurance Co. v. Steam-
boat Lady Pike, 614.
CARRIERS BY WATER, 641.
CONFEDERATE STATES. See FRAUD, 4; INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5.
1. A purchaser at a judicial sale under the judgment of the state court who
has paid only in Confederate notes cannot be regarded as a bond.fide purchaser
who has paid. Cuyler v. Ferrill, 100.
2. A contract, the consideration of which was Confederatb treasury notes,
made by citizens residing within the lines of the so-called Confederacy, is legal
and valid. Miller v. Gould, 310.
3. The so-called Confederate Government was not in the proper legal sense
a defacto governnment during the late rebellion. Chisholm v. Coleman, 693.
4. A judge of the Circuit Court of Alabama, who entered the service of the
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Confederate States, forfeited and vacated his office of judge under the state.
Chisholm v. Coleman, 693.
5. The Act of Congress of 1862, ch. 195, does not prevent a partywho was
in the Confederate army from acquiring property after the close of the war.
Thomas v. Hunter, 699.
6. The Confederate States, though not a defacto government in the highest
sense of that term, were a government of paramount force having actual su-
premacy within certain territorial limits, and therefore a defacto government
in such a sense as madc ivil obedience to their authority the duty of the inhabit-
ants of the territory under their control. Thorington v. Smith, 739.
7. Confederate notes as contracts in themselves are nullities, but they must
be regarded as a currency imposed on the citizens of the insurrectionary states
by irresistible force, and therefore contracts for payment in such currency,
made between citizens of the Confederacy in the ordinary course of civil busi-
ness and with6ut direct intent to assist the insurrection, are valid, and will be
enforced by the courts of the United States. Id.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
Debt contracted in foreign country is payable there, and in the legal cur-
rency of such country. Benners v. Clemens, 630.
CONGRESS.
A lawyer who is a candidate for Congress, but has no certificate of election,
receiving compensation for professional services before a department, between
the time of his election and taking his seat, is not within the Act of June 11th
1864. Bowman v. Coffroth, 755.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
I. Power of the Executive.
THE PREsIDENT'S PowEn or GENRAL A3MEsTY, 513, 577.
11. Power of Legislature. See VESSEL, 2 ; WITwEss, 2.
1. The Act of the Legislature of Connecticut of 1864, called the Frowage
Act, is not unconstitutional. Todd v. Austin, 9.
2. It is no objection to proceedings under the F'lowage Act, that the, mill is
not on the same tract of land upon which the dam is sought to be erected. Id.
3. The act entitled -1 An act making the county treasurer of San Joaquin
county ex officio tax collector," passed April 2d 1866, was not designed to
fill a vacancy in the office of tax collector, but it was to make the treasurer,
instead of the sheriff, of San Joaquin county tax collector. In so far as the
act provides for the transfer of said office to take place before an election of
such treasurer occurs, it is unconstitutional and void. People v. Kelsey, 119.
4. The legislature has the constitutional power by enactment to divest an
officer of an ex officio office to which he had been elected and duly qualified,
by a repeal of the law under which he became invested therewith, provided,
where such office be created mider the Constitution, such repeal does not in
effect abolish such office. Id.
5. In such case, however, this power does not extend to the transfer of an
ex offcio officewhich, under the Constitution, is required to befiled by election,
to the incumbent of another office who has not been elected to such ex officio
office. .Id.
6. The constitutional right of the citizens of one state to sue the citizens of
another in the Federal Courts, cannot be defeated by statutory limitation.
Cowles v. Mercer, 247.
7. The Act of July 3d 1863, of the legislature of New Hampshire, so far as
it deprives the owner of a dog of a trial by jury, is unconstitutional. East
Kingston v. Towle, 569.
8. Laud taken by the public for a highway and paid for, cannot be donated
to former owner without any consideration. People v. Commissioners of
Highways of Palatine, 630.
9. A right conferred by the Constitution is beyond legislative interference.
McCafferty v. Guyer, 694.






11. Where a person was regularly indicted, convicted, and sentenced under
proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction, the fact that the judge who
presided at the trial and passed sentence was within the class prohibited from
holding office by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, does not make the sentence a nullity nor entitle. the prisoner to
a discharge on habeas corpus. Ex parte Gri7ln, 358.
12. The third section of the fourteenth amendment did not by its own
direct and immediate effect, remove from office persons lawfully appointed or
elected before its passage, though they may have been ineligible to hold such
office under the prohibition of the amendment. Legislation by Congress was
necessary to give effect to the prohibition by providing for removal. Id.
13. The exercise of their official functions by these officers until removed
in pursuance of such legislation is lawful and valid. Id.
14. The government of Virginia formed at Wheeling by the loyal citizens
of the state after the passage of the ordinance of secession by the convention
at Richmond, having been recognised by the executive and legislative depart-
ments of the national government, must be treated by the courts of the United
States as the lawful government of the state. Id.
15. The Supreme Court of the United States cannot acquire jurisdiction
of a cause through an order of a circuit court. The Alicia, 446.
IV. Regulation of Commerce.
16. The term "commerce," as employed in section 8, art. 1, of the Con-
stitution of the United States, is not limited to an exchange of commodities
only, bat includes the transportation of passengers. People v. Raymond, 118.
17. When the Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional right, has by
its legislation established regulations of commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states, its authority is paramount and exclusive, and its
enactments supersede all state legislation on those subjects. Id.
18. Bythe enactment of section 285 of the United States Internal Revenue
Act, 2 Bright. Dig. 271, the Act of August 30th 1852, and the Act of March
6th 1855, 10 U. S. Stat. at Large 61, 715, Congress has undertaken to regu-
late the entire business of transporting passengers by sea. Id.
19. The act entitled S4an act to provide revenue for the support of the
government of the state of California, from a tax upon foreign and inland bills,
passengers, insurances, and other matters, passed lay 14th 1862, is a regula-
tion of commerce within the meaning of section 8, Art 1. of the Federal Con-
stitution, and therefore unconstitutional and void. Id.
V. Obligation of Contracts.
20. Alterations may be made in remedies, if they do not deprive a creditor
of rights he had when the contracd was made. Penrose v. Erie Canal Co., 59.
VI. Taking Private Property.
21. The provision of the state constitution of Connecticut, that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, is not a
grant of power to the legislature, but a restriction upon the right of eminent
domain. Todd v. Austin, 9.
22. The legislature may lawfully grant rights of easement to individuals or
corporations, to enable them to erect and operate structures, the result of
which will be beneficial to the public. Id.
CONTRACT. See CoIN, 3-4, 5; Coietox CARRIER, 4; CONFEDERATE STATES,
2; STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 3.
1. The rule of comity adopts the law of the country where the contract is
made, in determining its nature, construction, and validity, unless such con-
struction is contra bonos mores, or against some positive, law of the place
where the contract is sought to be enforced. B. 6 0. Railroad Co. v. Glenn,
247.
2. No right can be derived under any contract made in express opposition
to the laws of the place in which such contract is made. Id.
3. A simple request to do an act, will not constitute a contract which is bind-
ing. tells v. Mann, 378.
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4. A court will not set aside a contract for inadequacy of consideration
alone. Kidder v. Chamberlin, 502.
5. In restraint of trade in particular locality is valid. McClurg's Appeal,
630.
6. A contract to pay dollars made between citizens of any state maintain-
ing its constitutional relations with the National Government, is a contract to
pay lawful money of the United States, and cannot be modified or explained
by parol evidence. Thorington v. Smith, 739.
7. But the word dollars if used in a contract between citizens of a foreign
state could be shown by parol evidence to mean dollars of a different kind
from United States dollars, and the same rule must apply to a contract
between citizens of the Confederate States. Id.
8. A party entitled to be paid in Confederate notes, can only recover their
actual value at the time and place of the contract in lawful money of. the
United States. Id.
CONTRIBUTION.
THE LAW oF CONTRIBUTION, 449.
COPYRIGHT.
1. The term "dramatic composition" in the copyright acts includes all
manner of compositions in which the story is represented by dialogue or action
instead of narrative, and a scene or composition in which the author's ideas
are conveyed by action alone, is within the term. Daly v. Palmer, 286.
2. Stage directions, and the order of representation of events in accordance
therewith, are the subject of copyright. Id.
3. A dramatic scene or incident in which the ideas are expressed by action
alone, or by action and dialogue combined, is within the acts. Id.
4. Where two dramatic scenes are substantially alike, and the charge of
plagiarism is made in a bill by the author of one to restrain infringement of
copyright, and not denied by defendant's answer, the validity of the copy-
right is not impaired by showing that the incidents of which the scene was
composed were all known and in common use before the complainant's play
was composed, and that a story had been previously published in which the
incidents had been related in similar order. 1d.
5. The representation of a part of a play is an infringement of copyright.
Id.
6. The sale, with a view to public representation, of a play which infringes
the copyright of another, makes the seller a participant in causing the play to
be publicly represented, and an injunction will be granted against the sale.
Id.
CORPORATION. See AGENT, 1.
1. The judgment of another state decreeing the dissolution of a corporation,
will not prevent an action in this state begun prior to such dissolution from
proceeding to judgment. Hunt v. Columbian Ins., Co, 183.
2. The directors of a corporation are its chosen representatives and consti-
tute the corporation, to all purposes of dealing with others. Maynard v..Rre-
nan's Fund Ins. Co. 186.
3. A corporation has the capacity to compose and publish a libel, and is
liable to an action for damages therefor. Ad.
4. Has no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty which
created it, and unlike natural persons cannot change its domicil. B. &- 0.
Railroad Co. v. Glenn, 247.
5. A deed, made by a corporation created by the laws of Virginia, must be
determined by the laws of Virginia. Id.
6. In a suit to recover a dividend, declared "payable in dollars," evidence is
inadmissible that the corporation received its earnings in property other than
money. Scott v. The Central Railroad 6- Banking Co. of Georgia, 310:
7. Insolvency does not extinguish the legal existence of a corporation.
Parsons v. Eureka Powder Works, 439.
8. An act of the legislature of California making each stockholder of a cor-
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poration liable for his share of all its debts contracted while he is a stock-
holder, is sufficient to answer the requirements of the Constitution. Larabee
v. Baldwin, 503.
1 9. Insolvency and suspension of business being admitted, in answer to a bill
praying for dissolution of corporation, no excuse is admissible for the for-
feiture. People v. Northern Railroad, 631.
10. A corporation chartered to carry on a specified business in a city, is
not exempt from liability to municipal regulations. Frankford Passenger
Railway v. Philadelphia, 631.
i i. A corporation chartered by one state, and accepting a charter from
another, does not throw off its original obligation, nor shelter itself from any
violation of duty to the first state. Comonwealth of Penna. v. Pittsburgh
and Connellsville Railroad, 631.
12. Acceptance of second charter no ground of forfeiture of first. Id.
13. The Maryland Hospital has no power under its charter, to make a con-
tract for the support of a lunatic, during life, in consideration of a certain sum
of money. Hospital v. Foreman, 755.
14. Money paid on such a contract may be recovered back, less the cost of
keeping the patient. Id.
COSTS. See BAmxnurTcy, X1.
COUPONS. See INTEREST, 3.
COURTS. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 1 ; CONSTITUTIO.NAL LAW, 15 ; INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, 1.
THE ENGLISH JUDICIAL SYSTmf, 65.
1. A state court of Georgia, during the late war, had no jurisdiction to de-
cree partition of lands in that state while one of the joint owners was a citizen
and resident in one of the other states adhering to the Union. Cuyler v. Fer-
rill, 100.
2. The United States courts, therefore, will take cognisance of a bill for
partition of such lands and disregard the previous judgment. Id.
3. It is not essential that the jurisdiction of a superior court should affirma-
tively appear in the judgment roll ; if it does not, and the contrary does not
therein affirmatively appear, jurisdiction will be conclusively presumed. Hahn
v. Kelle - Morse, 122.
4. Where the judgment recites the fact that the defendant has been duly
served with process, it is a direct adjudication by the court upon the point, and
is as conclusive on the parties as any other fact decided in the cause, provided
it does not affirmatively appear from other portions of the record, consisting
of the judgment-roll, that the recital is untrue. Id.
5. After a state court has made an order under the Act of Congress for the
removal of a cause to a United States court, any further proceedings in the
state court or in any other state court by appeal or other process, are void.
Akerli v. rias, 229.
6. A state court making an order for the removal of a cause to a United
States court, has no jurisdiction to allow an appeal from such order and to
enjoin its clerk from certifying the record pending the appeal. Id.
7. Where the clerk refuses under such an order to certify the record to the
United States court, the latter will, on motion, allow the record and proceed-
ings to be supplied by copies or affidavits, and the cause to proceed as if the
record had been duly certified. Id.
8. Where a court has given judgment which has been reversed by the
Supreme Court of the state, and judgment entered in effect ordering a venire
de novo, the cause has not reached final hearing or trial, and a motion to
remove to a United States court is in time. Id.
9. Where special powers are given by statute to a court, all the requisites
of the statute must be strictly complied with to rende- the proceedings valid.
Cockey v. Cole, 248.
1O. THE JUDICIAL SYSTE31 OF SCOTLAND, 257.
11. The judgment of the Criminal Court of Baltimore on an appeal from the
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commissioners for opening streets is final and conclusive. Rundle v. Balti-
more, 313.
12. In legal contemplation the jurisdiction of the courts of Pennsylvania
is foreign to the jurisdiction of those of Maryland. Seevers v. Clement, 314.
13. At the common law the rule is well established, tiat the pendency of
a prior suit in personam in a foreign court, between the same parties, for the
same cause of action, is no sufficient cause for stay or bar of a suit instituted
in one of our own courts. It is only the definitive judgment on the merits
that will be considered conclusive. Id.
14. FORENSIC AND LEGISLATIVE DEBATE xx AxPRICA AS CO3PARED
WVITs ENGLAND AND FRANCE, 385. -
15. The Act, of February 28th 1839 providing for the transfer of cases
from one circuit court to another is not repealed by the Act of March 3d
1863. Supervisors v. Rogers, 439.
16. A county court has the power within certain limits, to revise its judg-
ments. Smith v. Howard, 507.
17. An order of an inferior state court under the Act of Congress for the
removal of a cause t6 a United States court, is reviewable by the Supreme
Court of the state, and an appeal to such Supreme Court suspends the vesting
of jurisdiction of the case in the United States court until the determination
of the appeal. Akerly v. TVilas, 558.
18. The Act of Congress provides for the removal of a cause before trial
if an action at law, or before .final hearing if a suit in equity, and after a
judgment in the inferior court it is too late to remove the cause, although the
judgment may be reversed by the Supreme Court of the state, and a new trial
or hearing ordered. Id.
19. A state court has no jurisdiction to grant a mandamus, to compel a
judge of a district court, to try an action which has been transferred to the
Circuit Court of the United States. Francisco v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 698.
20. TnE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF FEANCE, 705.
COVENANT. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, II; Vi;NDOR AND PURCHASER, 19;
WARRANTY.
CRINMIAL LAW. See EVIDENCE, 6; WITNESS, 2.
1. In general.
I. The statement of a prisoner accused of robbery, that he buried the money
in a certain place, admissible in evidence against him, though not voluntarily
made. People v. Hoy, 183.
2. Where the jury return a verdict of guilty of "1 involuntary manslaughter,"
a motion in arrest of judgment on the ground of there being two grades of
involuntary.manslaughter," should be sustained. Thomas v. State, 310.
3. Where a statute authorizes but does not cdmpel a party indicted to
become a witness in his own behalf, it is improper for the prosecution to com-
ment to the jury on the prisoner's refusal to offer himself as a witness, and
the court should when requested charge that no inference was to be drawn
against the prisoner from his refusal. People v. Tyler, 430.
4. An accomplice who has given testimony criminating himself as well as
his co-defendant, on whose trial he testifies, cannot refuse to answer fully on
cross-examination concerning the entire transaction of which he has under-
taken to give an account, and in which he had showi himself guilty. Foster
v. People, 494.
5. No consequences follow a conviction of felony, except such as are de-
clared by statute. Estate of Nerac, 506.
6. It is sufficient if the words used by the defendant, are set out in an in-
dictment for false pretences. State v. Call, 570.
7. Maliciously disturbing a meeting of school directors is indietable at com-
mon law. Campbell v. Com nonwealth, 736.
II. Burglary.
8. On the trial of an indictment for burglary, parol proof of possession of
the premises under a written lease is sufficient. Houston v. State, 311.
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9. Where the defendant was acquitted of an assault with intent to murder,
and afterwards indicted for the same act, under the charge of an assault of an
"aggravated nature,," the plea of autrefois acquit, held good. Holt v. State,
311.
II. Gambling.
10. Evidence that defendant was at a card table, with a faro box and cards
in his hands, warrants a conviction for gambling. Missouri v. Andrews, 379.
CURTESY. See HTUSBAND AND WIFE, II.
DAM. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2.
DAMAGES. See TREsPASs, 7-8.
1. A verdict for substantial damages, for barring a minister out of his
church on a Sunday, should not be disturbed. LZynd v. Menzies, 94.
2. In an action for causing wrongful death, funeral expenses are not reco-
verable as damages. Gay v. Winter, 183.
3. The measure of damages i'h an action for diverting a stream, is the de-
preciation in the value of plaintiff's premises. Easterbrook v. Erie Railroad
Co., 188.
4. The damages ordinarily recoverable for breach of contract, are those
necessarily followin the breach. Coal Co. v. Foster, 368.
5. The failure of an engine builder to furnish at a fixed time, according to
contract, to a coal company a suitable engine for transporting their coal,
entitles them to damages for their expenses in such transportation, with the
means they had, or the best they could procure during the period of delay,
beyond what they would have incurred with the engine. Id.
6. But they cannot claim also for the profits in the transportation by engine
of the extra quantity of coal they might have transported by it in the same
period. Id.
7. The value of the property destroyed, is the measure of damages in an
action against an agent for not procuring full insurance. Beardesley v. Davis,
379.
8. Exemplary are only to be given in case of fraud, malice, gross negli-
gence, or oppression. Cram v. Hadley, 439.
9. For breach of contract to make lumber, is the difference between the
cost of making and contract price. Hale v. Trout, 503.
10. Rule for, on breach of contract to sell real estate, is the difference be-
contract price and the value of the premises. Pringle v. Spaulding, 570.
DEBT. See CONFLICT OF LAWS.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See DECEDENT'S ESTATE, 1; EQUITY, I,
FRAUD, 5; INTERNATIONAL LAW, 10.
I. Sale or Conveyance fraudulent as to Creditors.
1. A conveyance made in consideration of the grantees assuming the mort-
gages on the property, void as to creditors, to the extent of the value of the
property above the mortgages. Head v. Combs, 120.
2. A judgment-creditor purchasing at sheriff's sale, under his judgment, is
entitled to have a mortgage upon the property, given by the defendant in exe-
cution in embarrassed circumstances, set aside and declared void. King v.
- Storey, 120.
3. By the Act of March 7th 1850 to prevent fraudulent trusts and assign-
ments, a creditor upon a return of an execution nulla bona, has a lien upon
the choses in action of his debtor. Green v. Tantum, 120.
4. The sale of a railroad with its franchises and rolling-stock, under a decree
of foreclosure, for a price far below its value, will be set aside as a fraud on
creditors. Drury v. Cross, 248.
5. Subscfuent creditors of a grantor cannot attack a conveyance valid when
made. Baker v. Gelman, 311.
6. A creditor who trusts his debtor after being informed that the latter has




7. A creditor who attaches and sells his debtor's goods, cannot prove his
claim under an assignment. Valentine v. Decker, 378.
8. To render a sale void as to creditors, the vendee as well as the vendor
must participate in the intent to delay. Leach v. Francis, 504.
II. Insolvency of Debtor.
9. State insolvent laws have no extra-territorial operation: and a creditor
cannot be compelled by a state of which he i not a citizen or resident to
become a party to insolvent proceedings therein; and such proceedings can-
not discharge a debt due to a non-resident creditor, unless he voluntarily sub-
mits to the jurisdiction by becoming a party to the proceedings, or claiming
a dividend thereunder. Hawley v. Hunt, 546.
10. A non-resident and non-assenting creditor is not bound by a debtor's
discharge under state insolvent laws, no matter where the debt originated, or
is made payable: citizenship of the parties governs, and not the place where
the contract was made or where it is to be performed. Id.
11. The history of the Federal and state adjudications on the subject of the
effect of discharges under state insolvent laws, examined by Dxs.oN, C. J.
I&d
12. An express promise by a debtor, after his discharge under the insolvent
laws, to pily a prior debt, waives the discharge. Knight v. House, 695.
III. Tender and Payment.
13. A creditor's agreement to receive the note of a third person, in payment
of his claim, with actual transfer, extinguishes the claim. Roberts v. Fisher,
638.
14. A debtor has the right in the first instance to make the appropriation
of payment. Neidig, Adin. of Neidig, v. Whiteford, 695.
DECEDENT'S ESTATE. See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRAToR, 6.
I. A creditor of a decedent cannot be prejudiced by the failure of the com-
missioners of the Probate Court to present his claim for allowance. Dickey
v. Corliss, 504.
2. Probate Court has no jurisdiction over trustee appointed by will.
Hayes v. Hayes, 575.
DEED. See CORPATION, 5; TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 1.
- 1. A deed altered by consent of the parties and redelivered by them is
good. Bassett v. Bassett, 183. /
2. The omission to read a deed to an illiterate marksman renders the
acknowledgement of no value. Suffern v. Butler, 183.
.3. Conveying premises, "subject to a mortgage executed by the parties of
the first part in the year'1856," sufficiently describes the mortgage. Johnson
v. Zink, 439.
DITCH. See WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, 2-3.
DIVIDEND. See CORPORATION, 6; TENANT FOR LIFE, 2.
DIVORCE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.
DOLLARS. See CONTRACT, 6-7.
DOWER. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, II.
EASEMENT.
1. A minister of the Protestant Episcopal Church has either the possession
of the church edifice or a right in the nature of an casement to enter therein,
on all occasions set apart in the parish for divine services, and a substantial
interference with such right will lay the ground for an action at law. Lynd
v. Menzies, 94.
2. The English ecclesiastical law forms the basis of the law regulating the
affairs of this denomination of Christians. Id.
3. In order to vest the pastor with the ordinary rights in the temporalities
pertaining to his office it -is not necessary for the congregation to be incor-




4. An easement will not be extinguished by mere non-user for twenty
years. Veghte v. The Raritan Water Power Co., 191.
5. Twenty years adverse enjoyment of a right to flow back water upon
another's land, will constitute an easement, which no interruption, except
for the same period, or a plain intention to abandon, will destroy. Carlisle
v. Cooper, 249.
ELECTION.
1. Where at an election for sheriff a majority of the votes are cast for a
disqualified person, the next in vote is not to be returned as elected. Com-
monwealth ex ref. JcLaughlin v. Cluley, 63.
2. Election returns should not be rejected where there is some irregularity
in the appointment of the officers of the election, unless injurious results
accrued therefrom. Keller v. Chapnzan, 185.
3. It is error in a county court to count votes not in fact received, even
though they were improperly rejected. Webster v. Byrnes, 185.
EJECTMENT.
1. Parties in possession under the defendant in an action of ejectment,
may be dispossessed by a writ of restitution. .3fayne v. Jones, 120.
2. Possession accompanied by a claim of the fee, will sustain an ejectment
against one showing only naked possession. Dall v. Fairer, 379.
3. A judgment in ejeetment for plaintiff, does not preclude the defendant
from asserting a title subsequently acquired. Mann v. Rogers, 505.
4. The right to set off the value of improvements, against a claim for dam-
ages in ejectment, depends upon their permanency. Carpentier v. Small,
505.
5. To maintain, must be disseisin of plaintiff, and wrongful possession by
defendant. Chamberlin v. Donahue, 632.
6. 'Vendor cannot eject his own vendee who has entered by license, or
under express agreement giving him possession, until the license is rescinded
or the agreement broken. Pierce v. Tuttle, 633.
7. Primd facie all who came into possession pending the action of eject-
meat, must go out, if the plaintiff recover. Wetherbee v. Dunn, 696.
ENTRY. See MORTGAGE, 1.
EQUITABLE ELECTION. See WiL,, 4-5-7.
EQUITY. See TRADE-MARK, 2.
I. A creditor cannot file a bill to set aside a transfer of property fraudu-
lently made by his debtor, until he has a judgment or execution, such as
would give a lien on that property if not transferred. Green Y. Tantum, 120.
2. A complainant cannot dismiss his own bill as to part of the relief prayed,
and proceed with the residue; he must apply to amend. The Caruren and
Amboy Railroad Co. v. Stewart, 121.
3. A court of equity will not relieve against a conveyance made to prevent
the grantor's property from being sacrificed and his creditors from recovering
their money. Eyre v. Eyre, 121.
4. In a suit to set aside a conveyance to a trustee to hold in trust for one
person for her life, and at her death to such of 'her children as she may
appoint, such children as the cestui que trust may have are not necessary par-
ties; their interest is too uncertain and contingent. Booraem v. Wells, 121.
5. An injunction will be dissolved upon the answer only when it denies
explicitly the facts upon which the equity of the bill is founded. Teasey v.
Baker, 122.
6. Injunction will issue to prevent the cutting down of fruit trees, shade
trees, or ornamental shrubbery, by tenant for life. Tainter v. Ma yor of Mor-
ristown, 127.
7. A bill in the nature of a bill quia timet, will not lie by heirs at law in
anticipation of the trusts under a will becoming incapable of execution.
Girard v. Philadelphia, 245.
INDEX.
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8. Every intendment will be mate to support a sale made under the decree
of a court of equity, unless the price is so grossly inadequate, as to injure
parties not in default. Farmers' Bank of Maryland v. Clarke, 250.
9. A bill, charging that a creditor cannot obtain a settlement of his claim
twelve months after an assignment, is not demurrable. Dobbins v. Porter,
309.
10. Will not set aside an agreement intended to defraud third parties, as
between the parties themselves. Sweet v. Tinslar, 438.
11. Will relieve against contracts made in mutual mistake. Watts v.
Cumins, 696.
12. When a party asks a chancellor to restrain the inequitable use of a
legal title, he must show such facts as entitle him to rescind on the ground of
either mistake or fraud. rd.
13. If defendant in chancery suit is sought to be made a party in his own
right and as executor, bill should state the fact, and pray process against him
in both characters. Carter v. lngraham, 697.
14. An aetion for the specific performance of a trust by the execution of a
deed, may be maintained without a demand of the deed. Jones v. City of
Petaluma, 697.
ERRORS AND APPEALS. See CounTs, 11; TAX.ATIOx, 5.
An appeal or writ of error which does not bring to the Supreme Court a
transcript of the record before the expiration of the term to which it is return-
able, is no longer a valid appeal or writ. Edmonson v. Bloomshire, 255.
ESTOPPEL.
1. A party claiming an estoppel must show that he has relied on some act
or incurred some liability, which would make it a fraud upon him to have the
truth shown. Genlinghouse v. Whitwell, 60.
2. The plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution, is not estopped
from showing want of probable cause, because he paid part of the sum claimed
in the original cause. Morton v. Young, 187.
-3. Ajudgment, to operate as an estoppel, must be upon the same subject-
matter and between the same parties. McKenzie v. B. and 0. Railroad Co.,
251.
4. Is never to be applied, except where to allow the truth to be told would
consummate a wrong. Franklin v. Merida, 506.
5. The owner of goods representing them as belonging to another, is es-
topped on an attachment from showing that the representation was false.
Horn v. Cole, 570.
6. A woman will be estopped from claiming dower, in land she encouraged
another to purchase, by stating she had no claim thereon. Malonyv. Horan,
571.
7. Whenever an act is done or a statement made by a party which cannot
e contradicted or contravened without fraud on his part and injury to others
whose conduct has been influenced by the act or admission, the character of
an estoppel will attach to what would otherwise be mere evidence. The State
v. Pepper, 665.
9. A surety signing and delivering to the principal obligor for delivery to
the obligee a bond, before the names of the sureties have been inserted in the
body of the instrument, will be held as agreeing that the blank for such names
may be filled after he has executed it. Id.
9. A surety signed a sheriff's official bond after the signatures of other
sureties, without reading it,,or hearing it read, or asking what it was, on
being told by the principal that it was a county paper and requested by him
to sign it. Hedd, that.such surety was not released by the fact that one of the
signatures before his was forged. Ad.
10. The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, is an estoppel as to
all matters put in issue by the pleadings. Jackson v. Lodge, 697.
11. One led by silence ignorantly and innocently to rest on his title, be-
lieving it secure, and to expend money and make improvements, without
timely warning, will be protected by estoppel. Chapman v. Chapman, 756.
INDEX.
EVIDENCE. See CORPORATI-ON, 6; CRIMINAL LAW, I ; FRAUD, 2; TnESPASS,
8-9; WITNESS, 7.
1. If the presiding judge is satisfied, upon inspection, of the genuineness
of a signature to an instrument, it is sufficient primdfacie, without other proof.
-Brown v. Lincoln, 61.
-2. Corporation books do not prove themselves : proof of their true character
must be given to authorize their reception in eyidence. Coal Co. v. Foster,
368.
3. At the time of offering evidence some competent purpose should be stated
as the ground for its reception, if it be not obviously competent on its face. Id.
4. Of similar accidents, is not admissible in an action against an overseer
of highways, for an injury resulting from breaks in the road. Sherman v.
Kortriqht, 382.
5. The proper time to object to the introduction of testimony for incom-
petency is when such testimony is offered in evidence at the trial. Sweeny v.
Mathews, 440.
6. Evidence that a person charged with larceny had previously attempted
.to purchase a chattel similar to that stolen, has no tendency to disprove theft,
and is not admissible for that purpose. Foster v. People, 494.
7. The declaration of a deceased person as to boundaries, though made off
the land, is admissible in evidenCe. Towers v. Silsby, 502.
8. The slightest circumstances tending to show malice are admissible, where
punitive damages are claimed. Lyon v. Hancock, 503.
9. County recorders' books, admissible in evidence to prove the claim of a
miner. Pralus v. Pacific Mining Co., 508.
10. The official character of persons acting as mustering officers, is prima
facie to be assumed. Chapman Township v. Herrold, 633.
11. Certificates from the War Department of the mustering in of recruits
are in no sense records importing absolute verity. Id.
12. The opinion of an expert must be predicated on facts proved or admitted,
or such as appear in evidence hypothetically stated. Rouck Y. Zehring, 697.
13. Declarations of an obligor shortly after the -execution of a note, that
he had not signed it are admissible, not as evidence that he had not signed,
but to show want of memory and understanding about what he had done.
Id.
14. ]Receipts, when mere acknowledgments of delivery or payment, are
but primdfacie evidence of the facts, and not conclusive: the facts may be
contradicted by oral testimony. Batdorf v. Albert, 697.
15. Of a general and well known usage among the banks of a city is admis
sible in an action against one of the banks: Chesapeake Bank v. Swain, 754
EXECUTION. See PARTNERSHIP, 6-9.; SET-OFFp 3; TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 2
1. An attachment or levy on the property of a debtor unlawfully arrested
is void. Clossoin v. Alforrison, 60.
2. Money or other articles of value with which a prisoner might obtain thi
means of effecting his escape, are subject to levy or attachment. Id.
3. It is a question in such cases for the jury, whether the officer making tbE
arrest acted in good faith or not. Id.
4. A lace shawl is wearing apparel and exempt from execution, but rings
and jewelry are liable for debt. Frazier and W1ife v. Barnum, 248.
5. In an action against a sheriff for a false return of.nulla bona, he will not
be liable unless the goods pointed out to him really belonged to the defendant,
and he has the right to demand that the sureties in the indemnity bond re-
side in his county. Commonwealth ex rel. Hood v. Vandyke, 317.
6. Primad facie all property is liable to execution, a claim of exemption
will not therefore avail an officer sued for neglect of duty in not levying.
Baker v. Brintnall, 380.
7. Levy upon property supposed to belong to the maker of a note, is no
satisfaction of the judgment, and no defence to an action against the endorsee.
Rice v. Groff, 634.
IDEX. 779
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See WILL, 1; WITNESS, 8;
1. The public administrator of the city of San Francisco only acts by virtue
of a special grant from the-Probate Court for each particular estate. Hatter
of the estate of Hamilton, 126.
2. While one administrator is in office, the probate judge or court cannot
appoint a new one. Id.
3. An executor has no power to sell the lands of his testator, unless
directed to do so by the will, either expressly or by implication. Lippincott's
Executor v. Lippincott, 127.
4. The capacity of an administrator to sue in assunpsit can only be raised
by a plea in abatement. Brown's Adm. v. Nourse, 185.
5. Where an executor is also trustee, he may be superseded as such but
allowed to continue as executor. Leddel's Executor v. Starr, 185.
. 6. If A suit is prematurely brought the executor must' plead the fact in
abatement and not in bar. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. v. Barlies, 440.
7. May charge decedent's estate for suitable headstones for grave, where
there are sufficient assets. Ferrier v. Myrick, 635.
8. An executor is not liable de bonis propriis on an oral promise to pay a
legacy. Okeson's Appeal, 698.
9. Guilty of a devastavit for failure to collect the debts of the estate.
Oglesby v. Howard, 698.
FIXTURES.
1. Trade fixtures and buildings for trade, no matter how strongly attached
to the soil or firmly embedded in it, are treated as personal property, and as
such subject to removal by the person erecting them. Northern Central Rail-
way Co. v. Canton-Co., 540."
2. The road-bed of a railway, the rails fastened to it, and the buildings at
the depots are real property; but under certain circumstances they may be
trade fixtures, and be treated as personal property. Id.
3. The ground upon which a tenant's right to remove his fixtures has been
limited during the continuance of his term, rests upon the doctrine, that if he
neglected to avail himself of his right within this period, the law presumed
that he voluntarily relinquished his claim in favor of the landlord. This
presumption cannot arise, where the term, being uncertain in its continuance,
may be terminated suddenly, and without previous notice. 1d.
FRAUD. See PARTNEnsHIP, 8; VENDOR AIeD PURCHASmE, 2-12.
1. One who participates in the fruits of a fraud, is equally liable with the
party originally committing it. lincoln v. Claflin, 250.
2. The declarations of each are evidence against the other, though made in
their absence. Id.
3. Interest is not allowable as a matter of law in torts. Id.
4. A payment in Confederate notes, after the surrender of the Confederate
armies, to one ignorant of the fact, is a fraud upon him. Blalock v. Phillips,
312.
5. A conveyance intended to delay a creditor even temporarily is void.
Sweet v. Tinslar, 442.
6. Where two persons are engaged in defrauding third parties, equity will
not relieve either, as against the other, from the consequences of his miscon-
duct. Stewart v. Ackley, 442.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
1. Part performance will take a contract out of the Statute of Frauds, when
it has been in part performed in such manner that a refusal would be a fraud
on the other party. Eyre v. Eyre, 119.
2. Where a verbal contract is to be performed within a year by one party,
but not by the other, the question whether the Statute of Frauds applies or not
depends on whether the suit is brought against the party who was to perform
his part within the year. If it is so brought, the statute would not apply, but
if brought against the party whose agreement was not to be performed within
the year, then the statute would be a bar. Sheehy v. Adarene, 326.
INDEX.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 3.
1. An agreement to sell hop roots in the ground, is not within the statute
as being an interest in real estate. Webster Y. Zielly, 441.
2. A subsequent written recognition of a contract void by the Statute of
Frauds is not only a ratification of it, but is a sufficient note or memorandum
of the contract within the statute. Id.
3. Whether a contract is within the statute, depends upon whether it is
essentially for the sale of goods, or for the skill and labor of a workman
expended upon them. Pitkin v. Noyes, 572.
4. The delivery and acceptance of part of the wood the first winter, on a
contract of sale of certain cords of wood, the vendor to deliver as much as he
could one year, and the balance the next, will take the case out of the statute.
Gault v. Brown, 572.
5. The authority of an agent contracting for the sale of land need not be
in writing. Pringle v. Spaulding, 572.
6. An agreement for the sale of land, to be valid, must be binding on all
the parties by whom made. Snyder v. Neefus, 572.
7. The owner who conveys must be bound by writing, but the other party




Converting stock belonging to his ward's estate, is liable for the highest
price the stock attains after conversion. Lamb's .Appeal, 635.
GUARANTY. See BILLS AND NOTES, 4.
The liability of guarantor for rent in arrear can only be discharged by pay-
ment, release, or other satisfaction. Kingsbury v. Villiams, 635.
HIGHWAY. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8; EVIDENCEi , 4; RAILROAD, 13;
TowN, 2.
1. Distinction between highway laws of Vermont and Massachusetts.
Morse v. Town of Richmond, S.
2. Time will not legalize an encroachment upon a public highway. Tainter
v. Morristown, 121.
3. Petition for, dismissed where the same had been personated within two
years previous, and rejected. Whitcher v. Town of Landff, 573.
4. Objections to form of petition for highway, must be taken before reference
to county commissioners. Wensworth v. Town of Farmington, 573.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
I. Marriage and Divorce. See ALIEN, 2, 3.
1. Divorce on the ground of adultery will not be decreed upon the uncor-
roborated testimony of a particeps criminis, herself unchaste and untruthful.
Clare T. Clare, 122.
2. Father not responsible for education of his child, born after decree of
divorce. Harris v. Harris, 573.
3. Parol promise of husband, during coverture, to pay ante-nuptial debt of
wife, is within the Statute of Frauds and cannot be enforced. Cole 'v. Shurtleff,
636.
4. Liability of husband for ante-nuptial debts of wife, terminates on wife's
death, unless enforced during coverture. Id.
I Curtegy, Dower. See ESTOPPrEL, 6.
5. The erection of buildings by the husband on the leasehold lands of his
wife will not take away her right of survivorship. iley's Administrator v.
Riley, 186.
6. The legal effect of wife's joining in deed of conveyance of land of hus-
band, is to release her dower. Maloney v. Horan, 573.
7. A wife taking conveyance of land, in which she was entitled to dower,
merges it. Id.
II. Separate Estate of Wife and Estate by Entireties.
8. Where A. makes a parol gift of land to B. and wife as long as they live,
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and the latter move on the land with the assistance of A., pay part of the
taxes, make valuable improvements and continue to reside on it for six years,
the gift will be treated in equity as in the nature of a contract executed, and
A. will not be allowed to recover possession of the land during the life of B.
or his wife. Freeman v. Freeman, 29.
9. If B. should abandon the land and either directly or by negleeting to
appear and defend, connive with A. to eject the wife, the latter will neverthe-
less be entitled to a judgment in ler favor for her own life. Id.
10. A husband's appropriation of money belonging to his wife's separate
estate, does not make them debtor and creditor, even when done with the
wife's consent. Kuhn v. Stanq.leld, 312.
11. A conveyance to husband and wife and their heirs prior to 1850, con-
stituted in Kentucky, as at common law, an estate by entireties, which neither
husband nor wife could sever or make liable for debts as against the other.
Elliott v. Nichols, 433.
12. The statute of 1850, abolishing the right of survivorship and turning
the estate into a tenancy in common, is not retrospective. Id.
13. The husband and wife cannot enter into a mortgage of her statutory
separate estate for the purpose of subjecting it to sale for the payment of the
husband's debts; and if they do, a court of chancery, will -not permit the
mortgage to be enforced by sale of the wife's separate estate, if she objects to
it. Bibb v. Pope, 490.
IV. Actions by and against Husband and Wife. See SPEcn'id PzuroRx-
ANcE, 2.
14. Since the acts of the legislature of New York of 1860, chap. 90, and
of 1862, chap. 172, a married woman may bring an action in her own name
against a wrong-doer, for a wrong committed upon her pers6n, without join-
ing her husband with her as a party. Ball v. Bullard, 381.
INFANT. See PARENT AND CHILD, 3 ; R vz]nsxio AND REMAINDER.
1; May recover for an injury caused partly by his own imprudent act, but
the father cannot. Glassey v. Hestonville Railway Co., 315.
2. To a child of tender years no contributory negligence can be imputed.
North Penna. Railroad v. Mahony, 315.
3. The contracts of infants are:-
(I). Binding-when for necessaries at fair rates;
(2). Void-when manifestly and necessarily prejudicial ; and
(3). Voidable, at the infants' election, either during minority or within a
reasonable time after attaining majority: including all executory agreements
not for necessaries, and all executed- contracts of this sort wherein the other
party can be placed substantially in statu quo. Robinson v. Weeks, 554.
4. May recover for what he has done in execution of a voidable, contract,
by restoring what he received under it. Heath v. ,tee ens, 574.
INJUNCTION. See EQUITY, 5-6; NuIsANOE, 2 ; TRADE-MARIK, 5 ; WASTE.
INNKEEPER.
A guest is not relieved from all responsibility in respect to his goods on
entering an inn. He is bound to use reasonable care and prudence in respect
to their safety, so as not to expose them to unnecessary danger of loss.
Bead v. Amidon, 507.
INSOLVENT. See BANKrUPTCY, I ; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, II.
INSURANCE. See DAMAGES, 7 ; AuTwnERsnsp, 16.
1. The words "totally disabled from the prosecution of his usual employ-
ment," in an accident insurance policy, mean wholly disabled from doing
substantially all kinds of his accustomed labor, to some extent. A disability
that prevents his doing as much in a day's work as before is not total, but one
that entirely prevents his doing certain portions of his accustomed work is
total, though there are other portions that he is able to do. Sawyer v. U. S.
Casualty-Co., 233.
2. Making brooms by hand, does not come within the prohibition "mills
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and manufactories," in a policy of insurance. Franklin Ins. Co v. Brock,
312.
3. A premium above the usual rate, is some evidence that a more than
usual risk was assumed. Id. 313.
4. Each policy is a distinct contract. Id.
5. An "accident" within the meaning of a policy of insurance means an
event which happens from some external violence or vis major, and which is
unexpected, because it is from an unknown cause, or is an unusual result of a
known cause. Schneider v. Life Ins. Co., 349.
6. Negligence of the person injured does not prevent it from being an
accident. Id.
7. Therefore in an action on a policy of insurance against accident, the
the negligence of the insured is no defence. Id.
8. A policy of insurance against accident contained a clause against liability
for injury resulting from the assured " wilfully and wantonly exposing him-
self to any unnecessary danger." The assured attempted to get on a train of
cars while in slow motion, and fell and was killed. Held, that the negligence
was not wilful or wanton, and the company were liable. Id.
9. Under an agreement to insure generally, an agent should obtain full
insurance if possible. Beardesleyq v. Davis, 378.
10. The assignee, of a payee who had an insurable interest, is entitled to
recover for a loss. Franklin v. National Ins. Co., 380.
11. A temporary insurance, effected without notice to the original insurer,
but not existing at the time of the loss, will not invalidate the policy. Ober-
meyer v. Globe Ins. Co., 380.
12. The maxim of" causa proxira non remota spectatur,' applied in insur-
ance cases. Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 442.
13. Insurance effected in the name of one of two owners of goods, upon the
representation of an agent that such is correct, may be recovered in case of
loss, by a suit in the nume of the party to whom the policy is issued. Alan-
hattai, Ins. Co. v. Webster, 757.
INTEREST. See FRAUD, 3; INTERNATIOVrAL LAW, 10.
1. Agreement to call at obligor's office for interest on bond and mortgage,
does not make the office the only legal place for payment. MfcCotter v. De
Groot, 125.
2. Equity will relieve obligor against breach of condition in consequence
of such agreement. Id.
3. Interest warrants or coupons in a negotiable form, draw interest after
payment of them is unjustly neglected or refused. Aurora v. West, 250.
INTERNAL REVENUE.
A written protest signed by the party, is a condition precedent to the right
to suc for the recovery of duties paid under the Act of February 26th 1845.
Nicols v. United States, 255.
INTERNATIONAL LAW. See PniZE.
1. An officer commanding troops of the United States in an insurgent state,
during the late civil war, seized property of a citizen of the state, and after
acquiring firm possession, sold it to a third person. After the war the owner
at the time of the seizure brought an action of trover for the value of the
cotton against the purchaser, in the Circuit Court of thh United States. Held,
that the Court had no jurisdiction, the seizure was made as an act of war, and
its validity was not triable in a municipal court, in a common-law proceeding.
Coolidge v. Gutherie, 22.
2. That this defence was admissible under the general issue in trover. Id.
3. That after complete possession of the cotton by the captor for twenty-four
hours it became booty by the laws of war, and the title of the hostile owner
was completely extinct. If the plaintiff in this case had any right it was
against the United States. Id.
4. All species of contracts or commercial intercourse, whether direct or




5. The, late contest between the United States and the Confederate States
was a war. Bilgery v. Branch, 334.
6. The government of the Confederate States being a government defacto
only, had jurisdiction and gave national character only to such parts of the
territory of the several states as were under its actual control. Id.
7. While therefore the city of New Orleans was under the authority of the
Confederacy, its citizens were citizens of the Confederacy and enemies of the
United States ; but when the city passed into the hands of the Federal forces,
it became again part of the United States, and its citizens became enemies to
the Confederate States. .d.
8. Where a citizen of Richmond drew a draft upon a citizen of New Orlins
in 1862, after .the capture of the latter city by the United States forces, and
the payee, in February 1863, endorsed the draft to another, a citizen of Vicks-
burg, within the Confederate States, who held it until October 1863, and then
presented it to drawee, at New Orleans, who refused payment, and the draft
was then protested: Held, that this was an illegal act, and the holder could
not recover. Id.
9. This is so whether the contract be held void under the general rules of
international law or under the Act of Congress of July 13th 1861. Id.
10. Where the debtor and the creditor's known agent to receive the money,
reside -in the same jurisdiction, the fact that the creditor is a citizen of a
power at war with the debtor's government, and resident in the hostile state,
does not absolve the debtor from his obligation to pay, and if he does not, he
is liable for interest. Ward v. Smith. 354.
11. When the United States forces, during the late war, acquired firm oc-
cupation of part of an insurrectionary state, the citizens of that part occupied
were restored to their relations as citizens df the United States, and contracts
between them and other citizens became valid. Graham v. lferrill, 477.
12. The Act of July 13th 1861, and the Proclamation of the President of
August 16th 1861, authorized, 1. Unrestricted commercial intercourse between
the citizens of loyal states and of those parts of insurgent states in occupation
of the Federal forces; and 2. Intercourse between citizens of the loyal and
insurgent states, subject to the license of the President and the regulations pre-
scribed by the Secretary of the Treasury; and the President's order of Febrn-
arv 28th 1862 was a general license to such intercourse. But by the Pre-
sident's Proclamation of March 31st 1863, the distinction was abolished, and
all intercourse between the citizens of loyal and insurgent states was made
subject to license by the President and the regulations of the Secretary of the
Treasury. Id.
13. It was not necessary to the lawfulness of such intercourse that the party
engaging in it should have a special license to himself'by name under the
President's own sign manual. The President's power to license might be
delegated or might be exercised by a general proclamation, such as those of
February.28th 1862 and March 31st 1863. rd.
14. The late rebellion was such a war as suspended the right of a citizen of
Mississippi to sue on a policy of insurance in a Connecticut company. Semmes
v. Ins. Co. 673.
15. In addition to this consequence of a state of war, the right to sue on
such a policy was suspended by the Proclamation of the President, of August
16th 1861. Id.
16. Where a policy contained an express provision that in any action under
it commenced more than a year from the time of loss, the lapse of time should
be conclusive evidence against the validity of the claim, the period of the war
must be omitted in computing the year. Id.
17. The condition of war existed as regards the state of Mississippi, at
least from 16th August 1861, when the President, in pursuance of the Act of
Congress of July 13th 1861, declared that state in insurrection. Whether
the war commenced, in contemplation of law, before that date, not decided.
Id.
18. The legal period of the termination of the war depends not on the con-
tinuance or cessation of active hostilities, but on the acts of the departments
INDEX.
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of the government to which political powers are intrusted. The Proclamation
of the President of June 13th 1865, removing the restrictions on trade as to
the states theretofore in insurrection, was a valid act of recognition by the ex-
ecutive department of the government of the termination of the war, and the
right of plaintiff in this action, to sue, revived from that date. Semmes v.
Ins. Co., 673.
JOINT LIABILITY. See PARTNERSHIP, 13.
One who previously assents to the commission of an act is jointly liable
with the one committing it. Treat v. Reilly, 505.
JUDGE. See CONuEDERATZ STATzS, 4.
JUDGMENT. See COURTS, 16; ESTOPPEL, 3-10.
1. The judgment of a court of superior jurisdiction may be collaterally
attacked upon. the ground that the court by which it was rendered had no
jurisdiction, either of the subject matter or of the person of the defendant, or
both. Hahn v. Kelly and Morse, 122.
2. Such facts must appear affirmatively on the record. Id.
3. May be taken to secure future advances when such is a constituent part
of the original agreement. Neldig, Adm. of Neidig, v. Whiteford, 695.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.
1. Omission by a justice to keep a docket will not render his judgment
void. Baker v. Brintnall, 380.
2. Non-residence must be pleaded to avoid the jurisdiction of a justice.
Oslbrne v. Gilbert, 381.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See FIXTURES, 3; NuIsANCE, 4.
1. Where the owner of land leased, is to receive part of the produce, instead
of rent, the lessor and lessee become tenants in common of the crops. Brown
v. Lincoln, 61.
2. A tenant's remedy against his landlord, for abandoning his first distress
without cause, and levying a second, is trespass, case or trover. Everett,
Adm., v. Neff, 251.
3. The lease of land for a term of years, with the exclusive right to bore
for and collect oil, passes a corporeal interest. Chicago Oil Co. v. United
States Co., 314.
4. A person is not liable for the negligent act of his tenants, in throwing
coal-dirt into a river, unless done by his authority or command. Little
Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Richards, 315.
5. Where tenant agrees to pay the rent in "certain specified repairs on the
house," and is expelled before the lease expires, he may recover the value
of the repairs, if they exceed the rent, in assumpsit. Smith v. Newcastle, 443.
6. Tenant at will entitled to the manure. Corey T. Bishop, 443.
7. A tenant is confined to the remedies specified in his lease, and a cove-
nant that the landlord will repair is not to be implied. Sheets v. Selden, 443.
8. Tenant cannot set up want of repairs, an a bill, to enjoin a writ of pos-
session issued by landlord. Id.
9. An injury caused to demised premises by a storm, is to be regarded as
an act of God. Polack v. Pioche, 501.
so10. A tenant cannot dispute his landlord's title before surrendering posses-
sion. Tewksbury v. Magraff, 506.
11. A general covenant of the tenant to repair the demised premises is
binding upon the tenant under all circumstances, even if the injury proceeds
from the act of God, from the elements, or from the act of a stranger.
Polack v. Pioche, 508.
12. Tenant not entitled to remove manure from farm, at the expiration of
lease, though more there than when he came. Hill v. De Rochemont, 574.
LEGACY. See WiLL, 5.
1. Where the real and personal estate of the testator have been blended in
one common fund, and the personalty is insufficient to pay debts, and the
words "not herein otherwise disposed of" are added to the residuary clause,
legacies will be charged upon the real estate. Dey v. Dey's Adinr., 127.
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2. In determining whether a legacy is chargeable upon the real estate, the
court will consider the circumstances of the testator, and the nature and
amount of his property. Day v. Day's Admr., 127.
LEGAL TENDER NOTES. See CoiN, 5.
1. LEGAL TENDER NOTES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, 193.
2. A bond payable in gold and silver coin, cannot be discharged by a ten-
der of United States notes, issued under the Act of February 25th 1862.
Bronson v. Rhodes, 251.
3. A bond payable, "in gold or silver coin," is satisfied by a payment in
legal tender notes. Murray v. Gale, 381.
4. United States notes are exempt from state taxation. Bank v. Supervi-
sors, 443.
LIBEL. See CORPORATION, 3.
LICENSE.
1. Where A. gave B. a parol license to cut timber on his land, and B. a
'like license to flow his lands by a dam: it was held that though mutual, the
licenses were independent, and either party might revoke his so far as it was
unexecuted. Dodge v. McCl intock, 62.
2. A license at law creates no estate in the lands of the licensor, but will
justify or excuse any act done under it. It is revocable even when given for
a consideration, but not if once executed. Veghte v. The Raritan Water
Power Co., 191.
LIEN. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 3; 'VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 7.
LIMITATIONS. See BiLns AND NOTES, 3.
1. The rights of the mortgagor and mortgagee are reciprocal, and when
one is barred by the Statute of Limitations the other is also. Arrington v.
Liscom, 123.
2. A party who has been in the exclusive adverse possession of lands for a
period of time which, under the Statute of Limitations, vests him with a title
thereto, may maintain an action against a party claiming under a record title,
to havp said adverse claim determined and adjudged null and void as against
him. Id.
3. The Statute of-Limitations is no bar to an action in this state (Maine)
on a note made in another state, when the defendant has not resided here.
Brown v. Nourse, 187.
4. A special statute enacting that demands against a bank must be pre-
sented within two years is legal. &evens v. St. Louis National Bank, 381.
5. A petition that shows upon its face that the cause of action is barred by
the Statute of Limitations, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action. Zane v. Zane, 444.
6. Will not run, between the death of the party and appointment of an
administrator in another state, as to claims prosecuted there. Hicks v.
Clark, 504.
7. The Maryland Code of Public Laws does not prevent a new promise to
pay, made on Sunday, from removing the bar of the Statute of Limitations.-
Thomas v. Hunter, 699.
LIS PENDENS. See CounTs, IS.
1. Unless the parties to the actions are the same, a stay of proceedings will
not be granted on the ground of lis pendens. People v. Northern Railroad,
638.
2. The plea of, must show that the same title, the same injury, and the
same subject-matter are in controversy, in an action to recover land. Larco
T. Clements, 699.
MANDAMUS.
1. A return to a mandamus should be sufficiently clear and full to enable





2. Membership of a club which is purely literary or social or scientific, and
does not own property, cannot be considered a right of property ; nor is the
right of meeting the other members a vested right of which courts can take
cognisance. Handamuts is not the proper form of remedy for a member of
such a club who is expelled. Wiaring v. Mfedical Society, 533.
MARRIAGE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See NEGLIGENCE, 4-6; RAILROAD, 6-19.
1. A laborer who leaves his employer, before his time of service has ex-
pired, can recover only pro rata on the basis of the contract price. Patnote
v. Sanders, 508.
2. In the absence of an express agreement ten hours work will be considered
a day's labor. Brooks v. Cotton, 570.
3. A master is liable to other servants in the same employment, if they are
injured by any neglect of duty on his part. O'Donnell v. Alleghany R. R.,
757.
MATERIAL MEN AND THEIR LIENS.
1. Materials furnished on the credit of a building, are a sufficient considera-
tion for the owner's subsequent promise to pay. Landis v. Roter, 694.
2. Repairs and alterations which do not change the exterior of a building
into a new structure, confer no lien. Miller v. Hershey, 699.
M1ILITARY SERVICE. See EVIDENCE, 10.
MORTGAGE. See ATTACHMENT, 1; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1-2; DEED, 3;
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 12 ; LIMITATIONS, 1 ; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 1-5.
1. An entry by a mortgagee, in the name of the whole, upon one of several
lots of wild land, conveyed by the same mortgage, and in the same county,
would give him constructive legal possession of all. Green v. Pettin gill et al.
64.
2. That a deed absolute on its face was really given as security for a debt
nd intended only as a mortgage, may be shown by parol proof. Hoqan v.
J7acques, 120.
3. A mortgage on a canal boat, or a copy thereof, by a statute of New
York is required to be filed in the office of the auditor of the canal department,
and within thirty days preceding a year another copy is required to be filed,
or the mortgage shall be void against creditors and subsdquent bond fide mort-
gagees and purchasers. Herrick v. King and Others, 124.
4. A tenant for years who offers to pay off a mortgage-debt has the i ight to
redeem, and to have the mortgage delivered to him uncancelled. Hamilton
v. Dobbs, 187.
5. The date of a mortgage is the day of its delivery. Russell v..Carr, 314.
6. The law will not note fractions of a day except to prevent injustice. Id.
7. In equity a conveyance, whatever form it may assume, will be treated as
a mortgage, whenever it appears to have been taken as a security for an ex-
isting debt, or a contemporaneous loan. Hinckley v. Wheeloright, 590.
8. But on the other hand, parties capable of acting may make conditional
contracts for sale of their property, and a vendor may make an absolute con-
veyance, subject to an agreement for a reconveyance, upon the repayment of the
purchase-money, on or before a fixed day. Id.
9. Nor does the fact that parties stand in the relation of mortgagor and
mortgagee prevent their dealing with each other as vendor and purchaser of
the equity of redemption, if the mortgagee does not make use of his encum-
brance to influence the mortgagor to part with his property at less than its
value. ld.
10. The intention of the parties is, in such cases, what the courts seek to
discover and enforce. Id.
11. As between grantor and grantee, where it appears that a conditional
sale was a mere cloak to an irredeemable mortgag, equity will let in the
grantor to redeem ; but it is a matter of grave doubt, whether, under such cir-




12. A mortgage of future-acquired chattels is valil only when the property
mortgaged may be regarded as a part of, or accretion to, property in actual or
legal possession of the mortgagor at the time of making the mortgage. 1171-
son v. Seibert, 608.
13. A mortgage of property in which tile mortgagor has no present interest,
and which he must acquire, if at all, in substitution for or independently of
any property he now has, is not valid to create any lien which equity will re-
cognise or enforce. Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
1. Neither the identity of a municipal corporation, nor its right to hold pro-
perty devised toit, is destroyed by a change of its name. Girard v. Philadel-
phia, 245.
2. Is bound to keep the pavement in front of the market stalls in repair.
Citql of Savannah v. Cullens, 314.
3. It is settled in Pennsylvania that the legislature may confer upon muni-
cipal corporations the power to assess the cost of local improvements upon the
property benefited. Hanmett v. City of Philaddph, 411.
4. But such local assessments can only be imposed to pay for local improve-
ments, clearly conferring special benefits on the properties assessed, and to
the extent of those benefits. They cannot be imposed when tie improvement
is either expressed or appears to be for general public benefit. Id.
5. The paving of a street, changing a road into a street, and bringing the
land fronting on it into the market as building lots, is a local improvement,
with special benefits to the land fronting on it, und tite cost of such paving
may be assessed on the property benefited. Id.
6. But when a street is once opened and paved, and has thus become a part of
the public highways of the city, the repaving of it, either with a new and dif-
ferent pavement, or by repairing the old one, is a part of the general duty of
the corporation, and cannot be paid for by assessments on the adjoining pro-
perties. Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See INFANT, 2 ; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 4 ; RAOLROAD, 15.
1. It is not contributory negligence on the part of a person crossing a
county bridge, knowing it to be unsafe, in the absence of distinct notice to
him or the public not to use it. Hlumphreys v. The County of Armstrong, 62.
2. It is the duty of county commissioners knowing a bridge to he unsafe to
render it safe, or else to close it up, so as to prevent the public using it. Id.
3. It is not the absolute duty of a railroad company to furnish a safe engine.
Its duty is to use care and diligence to furnish such an engine. Railroad Co.
v. Thomas, 154.
4. When an injury has occurred to a servant in consequence of a defect in
an engine, the burden is on the servant to show negligence in the master, and
it is not shifted by the fact that an injury has resulted from a defect. Id.
5. Notice to the proper officers or servants of the company is notice to the
company, and will render it liable unless it uses proper diligence in repairing
the defect ; but if it has made an effort by a competent servant to repair, it is
not liable. Failure to remedy the defect does not conclusively prove negli-
gence on the part of the workmen, and if it did, he is a fellow-'servant of the
plaintiff, for whose negligence the company is not liable. d.
6. The occupant of a second story is liable for the negligence of his ser-
vants in allowing a hydrant to flood the story below, and damage the godis
of the occupant of said story. Gass v. Callunry, 381.
7. M1ust be direct and proximate to defeat an action by the widow of the
deceased. M1-eyer v. People's Railway, 381.
8. The owner of a horse who allowed him to wander on the unenclosed
land of another, where he fell into a well and was killed, cannot recover
damages unless lie shows that the defendant was guilty of gross negligence.
Calkins v. Mathew,;, 447.
9. It is negligence in a passenger, or in an employee holding the relation




10. In an action whose graramen is ncgliger.ce, it is the duty of the plain-
tiff to show a case clear of contributory negligence. Waters v. Wing, 758.
11. Negligence is always a question for the jury, where there is any doubt
as to the facts, or the inference to be drawn from them. Penna. R. 1. Co.
v. Barnett, 758.
12. It is negligence for a traveller to drive on a bridge just as a train is
about to pass under it, if he has notice of its approach. Id.
NEW TRIAL.
Granting or refusing a new trial is always in the discretion of the court try-
ing the cause. Anthony v. Eddy, 445.
NUISANCE.
1. Unless an individual citizen is specially injured by a public nuisance, he
cannot bring a suit in his own name. fHigbee v. Camden 6-Amboy R. 1. Co.,
252.
2. The prosecution of a business, which renders the neighborhood uncom-
fortable, from smoke and noise, though not deleterious to health, will be re-
strained by injunction. Ross r. Butler, 252.
3. Continuance of, after notice to abate, renders party liable to indictment.
Vrason v. City of Augusta, 315.
4. Landlord not liable for nuisance on the premises of his tenant. Id.
5. Every continuance is a fresh nuisance in judgment of law, and an action
for damages will lie against the continuer, without a request to abate it.
Conhocton Stone Co. v. B. 6- N. Y. Railroad, 382.
6. The diversion of the waters of a navigable stream may be both a public
and a private nuisance, and a person especially injured may have an action
therefor. Yolo v. City of Sacramento, 670.
OFFICE AND OFFICER. See BOUNTY, 2; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 12, 13;
EXECUTION, 3; INTERNATIONAL LAw, ; SURETY, 3; TAXATION, 3;
VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 22-23.
Public officers are liable in damages to all persons who may be injured
through their malfeasance, omission, or neglect. Lick v. Madden, 701.
PARENT AND CHILD.
1. Father may maintain an action for debauching his daughter under age,
though she does not live with him. Greenwood v. Greenwood, 316.
2. A minor having enlisted with his father's consent, is entitled to the
bounty paid by the town to which he was accredited. Baker v. Baker, 509.
3. A minor son enlisting in the army with his father's consent, is entitled
to recover from his father all the money he earned and sent home during
such service. Ayer v. Ayer, 636.
PARTITION. See COURTS, 2.
1. Court will set aside and quash return of commissioners of partition when
made on wrong principles, or where there is great and evident inequality in
the division. Hay v. Estell, 125.
2. Parol promise by tenant in common to convey, no bar to suit for parti-
tion. Polhemus and Wife v. Hodson, 127.
3. A decree in partition, that such portions be allotted to the different ten-
ants in common as they have respectively improved, is correct. Seale v.
Soto, 509.
4. All the tenants in common should join in a partition. Sutter v. San
Francisco, 670.
PARTNERSHIP. See SURETY, 5.
1. A partner bound to account must give a clear and distinct statement of
his business, referring to particular books and the pages if necessary. Gor-
don's Adm. v. Hammell, 187-
2. A participation in the profits, to constitute a partnership, must be a gen-
eral participation in the profits as such. Hargrace v. Conroy, 253.
3. A share of the profits as compensation for services, will not constitute
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a partnership, unless its gross inadequacy shows it to be a mere pretext to
avoid responsibility. Hargrave v. Conroy, 253.
4. A partner with the knowledge of' his copartner converted to the use of
the firm money received by him as a United States deputy collector of
internal revenue. Held, that a bond of the firm given to indemnify the
sureties of the deputy collector was valid as a partnership obligation. Whar-
ton v. Clements, 299.
5. Such bond valid as an indeniity although executed before the sureties
had made good the defalcation, and although in form it was a bond for the
payment of money. Id.
6. When partpership property is sold under separate executions against
the partners individually, the proceeds represent the several interests of the
partners and not that of the partnership. Vandike's Appeal, 316.
7. A member of a ditch company has no general authority, by virtue of
such membership to bind the company by his contracts, like a member of a
jartnership. McConnell v. Denver, 505.
S. Fraud is sufficient ground to dissolve an unexpired partnership. Cottle
v. Leitch, 509.
9. Levy on land of a partner for partnership debt, cannot be defeated by
an attachment of individual creditors. Bowker v. Smtith, 675.
10. Partner may withdraw at any time and cause technical dissolution of
firm. Slemmer's Appeal, 637.
11. Equity will not decree dissolution and appoint a receiver unless on
good grounds. Id.
12. The joint creditors of a partnership, have an equity to prevent the trans-
fier and sale of the property of the firm, among the members where the same
is fraudulent. Flack v. Charon, 670.
13. The members of a partnership are not jointly liable in an action for a
fraud committed by one of the partners. Stewart v. Levy, 601.
14. Each partner being liable in solido for the firm engagements, has a right
to have the firm assets applied in the first instance to the payment of the firm
debts. Manhattan Ins. Co. v. Webster, 757.
15. The interest of a partner is only his proportion of the capital or profits
after all the debts are paid. Id.
16. A partner has an insurable interest in the entire stock, and on the
receipt for a loss of insurance he must account to the firm. Id.
PATENT.
I. For chemical substances should state the component parts with clearness
and precision. T§ler v. City of Boston, 253.
2. OUR PATENT SYSTEM, 321.
3. Where the question is on the validity of a patent the jurisdiction of the
United States courts is exclusive. - H. T. Slemmer's Appeal, 637.
4. In a joint invention, each party should invent or discover something
essential to the whole result. Id.
5. A joint patent taken out on the sole invention of one, or a sole patent on
an invention of more than one, is void. Id.
PAYMENT. See AGENT, 6 ; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 14.
1. The doctrine that bank bills are a good tender unless objected to at the
time, only applies to current bills which are redeemed at the counter of tile
bank, and pass at par value in business transactions in the place where offered.
Ward v. Smith, 354.
2. Payment of a check in the bills of a suspended bank, not known to the
patties to be suspended, is not a satisfaction. Id.
PHOTOGRAPHS.
TIHE LEGAL RELATIONS oF PHOTOGRAPtSS, 1.
PLATFORIL See RAILROAD, 13-14-15.
PLEADING. See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 3-5 ; Lis PENDENS, 2.
I. After a verdict for plaintiff, judgment will not be arrested because the
declaration alleges that the " Inhabitants of a town" were bound to keep a
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highway in repair, instead of alleging that the town was so bound. landers
v. Stewartson, 61.
2. A reversal in a court of last resort, remanding a case, cannot be set up
as a bar to a judgment in an inferior court on the same case. Aurora City v.
West, 254.
3. The rule that judgment will be given against the party who commits the
first fault in pleading does not apply to faults of mere form. Id.
4. A cause of action for false imprisonment may be joined with a cause of
action for slander, when both arise out of the same transaction. Harris v.
Avery, 437.
5. In declaring upon a special contract the entire consideration must be set
forth, and must be proved as alleged. Smith v. lVebster, 445.
6. Where the cause of action in the declaration is single and indivisible, a
plea of tender is an admission of the cause of action as laid. Dow v. Epping,
445.
7. In an action by assignee of a chose in action not negotiable against the
maker, it is unnecessary to aver in the declaration the consideration of the
transfer. Smiley v. Stevens, 648.
PRACTICE. See HiGHwAY, 3-4.
1. In New Hampshire any one who has rights involved may be admitted to
prosecute or defend an action. Parsons v. Eureka Powder Works, 446.
2. There can be no judgment against a trustee in an attachment suit of
real estate, unless there is first a judgment against the principal defendant,
and where there is a want of service upon him, the action will be dismissed
on trustee's motion. Washburn v. iining Co. and Allen Trustee, 634.
3. An instrument in writing agreeing to pay 150 every month for the
privilege of taking clay from certain land, is an instrument for the payment
of money within the Affidavit of Defence Law. Johnston v. Cowan, 755.
4. Filing the agreement is a copy of the claim, and no more could be
recovered than was due on it. Id.
PRIZE.
The bondfide purchase by a neutral, of a vessel of a belligerent, even though
the same is dismantled, will not protect it fiom recapture by the other bellige-
rent. The Georgia, 250.
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.
TSE CASE or A. BRADLEY AND THE SUPREME COURT OF TIlE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA, 129, 305.
PROMISSORY NOTE. See BILLS AND NOTES.
QUO WARRANTO.
1. Is not a writ of right. Com. ex rel. McLaughlin v. Cluley, 62.
2. The enactment that writs of quo warranto may be issued on the sugges-
tion of any person desiring to prosecute the same, means any person having
an interest to be affected. Id.
RAILROAD. See AGENT, 7; CouIt3oN CARRIER, 6, 7; DEBTOR AND CRE-
DITOR, 4; NEGLIGENCE, 3.
1. A charter granted by two states to a company to construct a railroad is
not only a contract with the company, but a compact between the states.
The Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad Co. v. Speer, 63.
2. Connecting lines of railroad may lawfully agree to divide the fares
unequally. Sussex Railroad v. M1forris and Essex, 126.
3. A contract between railroad companies using the same gauge, to trans-
port passengers and freight continuously over both lines, does not imply a
contract on the part of either company that it will not change the gauge of
its road. Id.
4. If a passenger is ready and willing to pay hii fare when demanded, a
railroad company is bound to carry him, if there is room in the cars. Far-
hell v. Central Pacific Railroad Co., 187.
5. A railroad company in its character of master is responsible to its
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employees for the proper construction of its road, its adjuncts and equipments,
and the selection of competent and skilful subordinates to supervise, inspect,
repair, regulate, and control its operations. If it fails in any of its duties in
these respects, and its servant thereby sustains injury, he may recover.
lVarner v. Erie Railway Co., 209.
6. If, however, these obligations are once performed, and its structures are
properly made, and it employs from time to time competent and trustworthy
ngents to examine and test the continued sufficiency of such structures, and
these tests are applied with the frequency and in the manner which time and
experience have sanctioned, no action will lie though its structures turn out
to be insufficient and the servant in consequence is injured. Id.
7. Where, inder such circumstances, a bridge belonging to the company
fell while the plaintiff in the course of his employment was passing over it
upon a train, Held, in the absence of notice of its insufficiency, that it was
error to leave the question of negligence to the jury. Id.
8. A through ticket over three several distinct lines of passenger transpor-
tation, issued in the form of three tickets on one piece of paper, and recog-
nised by the proprietors of each line, is to be regarded as a distinct ticket for
each line. Kniqht v. Railroad Co., 654.
9. The rights of a passenger purchasing such a ticket, and the liabilities of
the proprietors of the several lines recognising its validity, are the same as
if the purchase had been made at the ticket office of the respective lines. Id.
10. Common carriers of passengers are not bound to insure the absolute
safcti of their passengers ; but they are required to exercise the strictest care
consistent with the reasonable performance of their contract of transportation.
Id.
11. To render them liable for an injury to a passenger while under their
charge, it is enough if it was caused solely by any negligence on their part,
however slight, if, by the exercise of the strictest care and precaution, rea-
sonably within their power, the injury would not have been sustained. Id.
12. Where a railroad company make a wharf subsidiary and necessary to
the proper use and enjoyment of their road, it was held, in an action to recover
for an injury on the wharf,
(I.) That the defendants are bound to exercise the same degree of care, in
making the wharf safe and convenient for their through passengers to travel
over, as is required of common carriers of passengers, although they required
them to disembark at their depot, forty rods distant from the steamboat; and,
(2.) That this liability continued until, in the ordinary course of their
passage over the wharf, they reached the point where the liability of the steam-
boat company commenced. Id.
13. The platform of a railroad company at a station is in no sense a public
highway. There is no dedication to public use as such. Gillis v. Railroad
Co., 729.
14. The platform is for the accommodation of passengers, and being unen-
closed, persons have the privilege but have not the legal right of walking over
it for other purposes. Id.
15. The owner of property is not liable to a trespasser or to one who is on
it by mere permission or sufferance, for negligence of himself or servants, or
for that which would be a nuisance in a public street or common. Id.
16. To persons who come on to a platform to meet or part with passengers,
or who stand in such relation to the company as requires care, the company is
bound to have the structure strong enough to bear all who could stand upon
it. Id.
17. The owner is bound to have the approach to his house sufficient for all
visitors on business or otherwise, but if a crowd gathers on it to witness a
passing parade, &c., and it breaks down, though not sufficient for its ordinary
use, he is not liable to one of the crowd who might be injured. Id.
18. Is bound to furnish a safe and sufficient roadway to its servants as well
as others travelling over it. O'Donnell v. Allegheny R. R., 757.
19. A carpenter working for a company, is not to be esteemed as employed
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in the same general service with the hands running the trams, so as to relieve
the company from responsibility for injury to him from their negligence.
O'Donnell v. Allegheny Railroad, 757.
20. A railroad company is liable for an injury resulting from an act, lawful
it itself, but negligently performed. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Barnett,
758.
RECEIPT. See EVIDENCE, 14; STAMPS, 1.
RECEIVER. See PARTNERSMsp, 11.
A receiver will only be appointed on bill filed for that purpose, and not
against a complainant upon defendant's application. Leddel v. Starr, 185.
RECORDS.
The records in public offices in other states, may be proved by a sworn copy,
or certificate according to the Act of Congress. Condit v. Black-well, 188.
RELEASE. See TRESPASS, 2.
REPLEVIN.
I. The right to the possession, is all that is necessary to maintain replevin.
Sprague v. Clark, 510.
2. Title to property in replevin not changed, by issuing writ and giving
bond. Keyser v. Stien, 
576.
3. Surety in replevin-bond who takes possession of property, has no better
rights than plaintiff in the suit. Id.
REVERSION AND REMAINDER. See TENANT FOR LIFE, 2.
The estate in remainder of an infant will not be sold when the benefit is
doubtful. In the matter of Sale of Lands of Steele, 126.
RIPARIAN OWNER.
1. The common law rule of riparian ownership applies to the survey and
sale of public land (under an act of Congress), where the land borders
on a stream not navigable, but on navigable streams the title of the owner
stops at the stream, and does not come to the mediumfilum. Railroad Co. v.
Shurmeir, 254.
2. Slow accretions to the bank of a river become the property of the land-
owner on whose side they occur. Gerrish 'v. Clough, 446.
SALE. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 1 ; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 22 ; WILL, 1.
SET-OFF. See BA NX, 2 ; EJECTMENT, 4.
1. A purchaser buying goods from a broker which are not in his posses-
sion cannot set off a claim against the broker in a suit for the purchase-money.
Dunn v. Wright, 59.
2. A debt not in judgment cannot be set off to a judgment. 72iorp v.
tegefarth, 62.
3. There is no right to tender a chose in action against the creditor in pay-
ment of a judgment or execution. .d.
SHERIFF. See ELECTION, 1 ; EXECUTION, 5.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See EQUITY, 14.
1. A delay of fifteen years is a strong ground for refusing a decree of'
specific performance. Eyre v. Eyre, 119.
2. No decree can be made in a suit by husband and wife for specific per-
formance, where the wife dies, and her children have not been made com-
plainants. Hand v. Jacobus, 122.
STAMPS.
I. The receipt of an express company for goods delivered to them is not
subject to a stamp. Belger v. Dinsmore, 188.
2. An internal revenue stamp is no part of a note.. Hallock v. Jaudin,
188.
3. A letter stating that a note will be paid by a creditor, does not require a
stamp. Boyd v. Hood, 317.
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4. The accidental omission to stamp a note, at the time it is made, will not
invalidate it. Green v. Lowry, 317.
5. A judgment on an unstamped bond is not void. Bitter v. Brendlinger,
638.
6. A promissory note made since the 30th day of June 1864 cannot be
stamped in open court, and then read to the jury. Wigham v. Pickett, 701.
STEAIBOAT. See COMMON CARRIER, 2.
STOCK. See GUARDIAN ; TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 4-7.
1. The signing of a ceitificate, that certain parties have agreed to form a
bank, with the number of shares affixed to the several signatures, renders the
subscribers liable to the bank as stockholders. Cole, Receiver v. Ryan, 379.
2. A transfer of stock bond fide, renders the transferee liable for the
amount unpaid. rd.
STREAM. See NUISANCE, 6 ; RIPARIAN OWNER, 1-2.
STREET. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 5-6.
SUBROGATION.
1. Subrogation is purely an equitable result, and depends on facts to de-
velop its necessity, that justice may be done. Mosier's Appeal, 63.
2. Subrogation is applicable wherever a payment is made under a legiti-
mate and fair effort to protect the ascertained interests of the party paying,
and where intervening rights are not legally jeopardized or defeated. Id.
SURETY. See ESTOPPEL, 9; REPLEVIN, 3.
1. Mere forbearance by a creditor to the principal debtor, however preju-
dicial it may be to the surety, will not have the effect of discharging him
from his liability. Railroad v. Shaqffer, 110.
2. The case of the sureties of a railroad officer, charged with the receipt
and disbursement of money, is within the rule ; and the company is not bound
to dismiss the officer as soon as any default becomes known, and to give notice
to the sureties that they may take measures to secure themselves by proceedings
against the principal. Id.
3. Where an officer of a corporation violates his duty, knowledge on the part
of other officers of the corporation of the default, or even connivance in it,
does not discharge the sureties. Id.
4. Two or more persons severally signing a promissory note as sureties do
not thereby incur a joint liability. Bunker v. Tufts, 188.
5. Several sureties paying the debt of their principal is no evidence of a
partnership between them. rd.
TAXATION. See CoiN, 2; LEGAL TENDER NOTES, 4; VENDOR AND PUR-
CHASER, 14.
1. An assessment of a tax in St. Louis, against a lot, is not vitiated by an
error in respect to the ownership thereof. City of St. Louis v. De Noua,
383.
2. The income tax of 2 per cent. under the Act of February 1865, is not
in violation of the Constitution. Glasgow v. Rowse, 383.
3. A tax collector has no right to take money to pay taxes from a drawer
in a bank, without the consent of the officers. National Bank of Sandy Hill
v: Fancher, 384.
4. Certificates of indebtedness issued by the United States for supplies fur-
nished to carry on the war, are exempt from state taxation. The Banks v.
The Mayor, 447.
5. A writ of error lies from the Supreme Court of the United States, to
the decision of a state court against a right, privilege, or immunity claimed
under the Constitution. Id.
6. A town summoned as trustee cannot apply tax due by the defendant
cestui que trust, to the payment of a debt which the town owes said defendant.
J'ohnson v. Howard, 638. -
TELEGRAPH. See BROKER, 4.
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TEN-ANT IN- CO110N. See LA.DLORD AND Tnx iAT, 1; PAXTITION,, 2-4.
A conveyance by any number of tenants in common, less than the whole,
though not void, cannot be made to prejudice the tenants not joining in the
deed. Gates v. Salmon, 510.
TENANT FOR LIFE. See EQUITY, 6.
1. Tenant for life is bound to repair the ordinary wear and tear to the pre-
mises. it the latter of Lands of ilfary E. Stull, 127.
2. The accumulated surplus or undivided earnings of an incorporated com-
pany are part of its capital, and as such belong to the remainder-man; but
an extra dividend declared out of the earnings belongs to the life tenant.
Van Doren v. Van Doren's Trustee, 189.
TENANT FOR YEARS. See MRITGAGE, 4.
TENDER. See PAYMENT, 1; SET-OFF, 3.
TIMER. See TRESPASS, 4; WASTE.
TOWN. See ASSUBIPSIT, 4; BOVNTY, I; INTERNATIONAL LAw, 2; TAXA-
TION, 6.
1. Towns owe a statutory duty to travellers, for the breach of which the
party injured may maintain an action, to remove from the margins of their
highways objects unlawfully deposited there, which, by their frightful appear-
ance, make it unsafe to travel the road with ordinary horses. .Morse v. Town
of Richmond, 81. -
2. The duty of the town to remove the obstruction from the highway does
not attach until they know of it, or ought to know of it, nor while it is upon
the highway a reasonable time for the purposes of transportation over it. Id.
3. Though a town is not bound to work the whole width of the road where
the travel does not require it, yet they have a right to control the whole width
and have a corresponding duty. If they suffer objects to remain deposited on
the margin which, by their frightful appearance, make the whole road unsafe,
they will be liable for such accidents by fright as fire the natural result of
their neglect. Id.
4. Towns are held to a higher responsibility with reference to removing
deposits of private property which are placed on the road without right and
obstruct public travel by their frightful appearance, than with reference to
removing equally dangerous objects which either are incident to the nature
of the soil and country, or are thrown upon the margin in process of con-
structing the road. Id.
5. The selectmen of a town may appoint an agent to build or repair roads
or bridges. Dew v. Epping, 445.
TRADE. See CONTRACT, 5; FIXTURES; 1.
TRADE-MARK.
1. A trade-mark having upon it a false statement which did not, and could
not produce any effect upon the purchasers of the article, is nevertheless so
tainted by the falsehood that equity refuses to protect it. Palmer v. Harris,
137.
2. A trade-mark for a brand ofsegars, manufactured in New York, had upon
it, in Spanish, words, which interpreted into English, mean: " Factory of
segars from the best plantations de la Vuelta Abajocalle del Agua, Habana."
Equity refused, on the ground of the falsehood, to enjoin a printer from coun-
terfeiting the device, and supplying the trade with his imitations. 2d;
3. The complainant having first appropriated and applied the name of
"Charter Oak" to a certain pattern of stoves manuthetured and sold by him,
will be protected by injunction in the exclusive use of the name as a trade-mark.
.2Filler v. Fassett, 402.
4. Any contrivance, design, device, name, or symbol, which points outthe
true source and origin of the goods to which it is applied, cr which designates
the dealer's place of business, may be employed as a trade-mark, and the right
to its exclusive use will be protected by the courts. Id.
5. The appropriation of any prominent, essential, or vital feature of atrade-
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mark by another, is an infringement. If the trade-mark is simulated in such
manner as probably to deceive customers, the piracy may be checked by in-
junction. illey v. Fassett, 402.
6. 'The statute of Missouri providing for the filing of a description of any
trade-mark sought to be used, was not designed to abridge or weaken the
right to any trade-mark which may be acquired in the usual way. It, does
not authorize the appropriation by one party of a trade-mark the title and
ownership of which belongs to another. Id.
TRESPASS.
1. Joint trespassers may be sued together, or any of them separately, and
the non-joinder of the others is no defence. Bailey v. Berry, 270.
2. A release to one of several joint trespassers will discharge all ; but it
must be a technical release, not merely a covenant not to sue, or other instru-
ment amounting to a release by implication merely. Id.
3. An agreement with a portion of such joint trespassers to withdraw the
suit as to them, for a certain sum of money, will not discharge the others.
Id.
4. A wrong-doer cannot dispute the title of one in the possession of land
and claiming as owner, in an action against him for cutting down and carry-
ing Away timber. Nelson v. Jather, 447.
5. A person resisting one specially authorized, to serve process, if cogni-
sant of the fact, is liable in an action of trespass for an assault and battery.
Leachv .Francis, 511.
6. The plaintiff was unlawfully seized by the defendants, carried thence
three miles and confined in a room several hours, and thence to a town meet-
ing, where he took an oath to support the Constitution of the United States,
and was discharged. In the trial of an action of trespass,'based upon these
facts, the plaintiff claimed, (1) Actual damages resulting from his seizure and
detention ; (2.) Damages for the indignity thereby suffeied; and (3.) Puni-
tive damages. Held:-
.7. That the plaintiff was entitled to recover full pecuniary indemnity for
the actual corporeal injury received, and for the actual damages directly re-
suiting therefrom, such as loss of time, expense of cure, and the like;
8. That the declarations of the plaintiff, made prior to the unlawful arrest
and tending to provoke the same, not being a legal justification thereof, are in-
admissible in mitigation of the actual damages; but,
9. That such declaration made on the same day, and communicated to the
defendants prior to such arrest, together with all the facts and circumstances
fairly and clearly connected with the arrest, indicative of the motives, provo-
cations, and conduct of both parties, are admissible upon the question of
damages claimed upon the other two grounds. Prentiss v. Shaw et al., 712.
TROVER.
It is no defence to an action of trover that the property sold was govern-
ment bonds payable to bearer, provided the principal was not the bond fide
purchaser. Kimball, Executor, v. Billings, 189.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See DECEDENT'S ESTATE, 2; EQUITY, 4-7;
PRACTICE, 2.
1. Where a deed expresses a nominal consideration never paid, no use results
to the grantor. Hogan v. Jacques, 120.
2. A trust estate cannot be sold by execution. Id.
3. The title of a bond fide purchaser from one, who bought at an illegal
sale of a trustee or executor, will not be set aside. Booraemn v. Wells, 128.
4. The holder of stock as trustee has pjimd facie no right to pledge it as
security for his private debt, and one who takes it under such circumstances
does so at his own peril. Shaw v. Spencer, 219.
6. The word " trustee" in the certificate is notice to all persons to whom
the certificate may be delivered, sufficient to put the taker on inquiry as to
the nature of the trust and the lawfulness of the pledge. Id.
6. No usage of brokers or course of business can avail against these rules
of law, and therefore evidence of such usage is inadmissible. Id.
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7. Where the equitable owner of stock which has been pledged unlawfully
by the trustee, has given notice of his rights to the pledgee, his mere presence
and failure to object to the payment by the pledgee, of an assessment on the
stock, does not stop him from the legal assertion of his title, though equity
will require him to refund the amount so paid. Shaw v. Spencer, 219.
8. A trustee is only bound to use ordinary diligence in the preservation of
the trust funds. Campbell v. Miller, 318.
9. Trustees cannot retire with their counsel, and prepare their answers to
depositions, they must be written by the magistrate. Morrison v. Annis,
571.
10. One cannot be made liable as trustee, for securities which he holds as
the agent of another. Smith v. W iley, 634.
11. Persons who have traded with and given credit to the trustee of a mar-
ried woman's separate estate, cannot, in the first instance, go into chancery
to have their debts paid out of the trust estate. Pollard et al. v. Cleveland et
al., 702.
12. Where A. agrees with B. that he will purchase a sheriff's certificate of
sale of a mining claim, and take an assignment in his own name for the joint
benefit of both, and A. makes the purchase, B. furnishing his proportion of
the money, and takes a sheriff's deed in his own name, a resulting trust arises,
and A. holds a part of the property in trust for B. Dikeman v. Norrie, 702.
VENDOR AND PUACHASER. See AssUMPSIT, 6; CONFEDERATE STATES,
1; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 8; EJECTMENTI 6.
I. Of Real Estate.
1. A conveyance of part of mortgaged premises "subject to the payment
of all liens now on the same," does not create a personal obligation on the
vendor to pay the mortgage or any part of it; but it makes the part so con-
veyed as against the residue subject to its proper proportion of the mortgage-
debt, and to that only. Hy v. Bramhall, 124.
2. A purchaser who bays land at a lower price by iepresenting a mortgage
as an encumbrance, which was not, will be compelled to make good the
amount of it to the vendor. Winans v. Winans, 186.
3. The rule that the title of a purchaser acquired under a judicial sale will
be held good, though the judgment be afterwards reversed, applies to all pur-
chasers, whether parties to the suit or not. Gordon v. Canal Co., 279.
4. By a decree of the Circuit Court, a claim was held to be a lien on an
entire canal. From this decree an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court,
pending which the canal was sold under the decree, and the plaintiff in the
decree became the purchaser. The Supreme Court reversed the decree on the
ground that the claim was a lien on a section of the canal only. Held, that
plaintiff's title under the sale was not affected by the reversal. .d.
5. A purchaser is not entitled to the rents accruing between the time of
sale and delivery of the deed, on the foreclosure of a mortgage. .Mitchell v.
Bartlett, 441.
6. Vendee will not be deemed to have assented to a contract for sale of
land, which only binds one of two vendors. Snyder v. Neefus, 639.
7. The vendor of real estate, retains a lien for the unpaid purchase-money,
even after conveyance of the legal title to the vendee. Schwarz v. Stein, 702.
8. The possession of land by a stranger to the record title, is sufficient
notice of a claim, to put a purchaser on inquiry. Pell v. McElroy, 703.
II. Of Chattels.
9. An unconditional delivery of goods without payment, does not pass the
title, where there has been fraudulent misrepresentation. Hicks v. Camp-
bell, 190.
10. A vendor cannot demand immediate payment of the purchase-money,
after an agreement to extend the time of such payment. Cythe v. La Fontain,
190.
11. A vendee, cannot rescind a contract of sale after receiving part of the
property without an offer to restore. -W[oodruff v. Peterson, 190.
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12. The doctrine of fraud in law as applicable to change of title in personal
property without change of possession is merely a kind of rule of evidence
prescribing what facts proved shall be held to conclusively show the existence
of fraud, and thus creating a kind of estoppel in pais. Daniels v. Nelson,
149.
13. The rule rests upon grounds of policy only, and its application has
been limited to creditors and bondfide purchasers. It does not apply in favor
of a state or county levying a tax. Id.
14. Therefore, a chattel belonging to A. cannot be levied upon for a tax
due by B., although it formerly belonged to B. and still remains in his pos-
session. Id.
15. The title to articles too ponderous for actual delivery, may pass by
symbolical delivery. Thompson v. B. 6- 0. Railroad Co., 318.
16. Title to property will not pass where anything remains to be done to
ascertain it. Camp v. Norton, 319.
17. Refusal to deliver after demand, entitles the vendee to an action for
non-delivery. .6d.
18. The consummation of the sale of a chattel, is the delivery, and subsequent
agreements as to time of payment do not alter it. Blow, Adm., v. Spear, 383.
19. Where covenants are mutual and dependent, performance or an offer
to perform, on the one part, is a condition precedent to the right to insist upon
performance on the other part. Hill v. Grigsby, 511.
20. One induced to purchase part of a vessel on a fraudulent representation
of the cost price, is entitled to recover the over-payment. Pendergast v. Reed,
695.
21. Where the title to property is to remain in the seller, until the payment
of the price upon a fixed day, such payment is a strict condition precedent, and
the right of property is not vested in the purchaser. Putnam v. Lamphier,
701.
22. The sale of a horse belonging to the United States, by an officer of the
army, to a bond fide purchaser, but without the authority or assent of the
government, will not pass the title against the latter. Johnson v. Frisbie, 756.
23. Persons dealing with agents or officers in regard to public property, are
bound to know the extent of their authority. Id.
VESSEL. See ADIxzALTY, 3-4-5 ; PRIZE ; VENDOR AND PuRCHAsER, 20.
1. Congress has the exclusive power to provide where the evidence of title
of registered and enrolled vessels shall be recorded. Wood v. Stockwell, 190.
2. The state legislature has no authority, directly or indirectly, to add to
or dispense with the requirements of section 1 of the Act of Congress of July
29th 1850, entitled an "Act to provide for recording the conveyances of ves-
sels." Id.
WAR. See INTERNATIONAL Lkw, 1-14 ; TAxATION, 4.
WAREHOUSEMAN. See BAILRENT, 3.
WARRANTY.
Covenant to warrant and defend against all persons claiming premises,
means persons having valid claims. Gleason v. Smith, 632.
WASTE. See WITNESs, 3.
An injunction will be granted to prevent a tenant from committing waste,
by cutting timber, or an action will lie to recover damages by the remainder-
man. McCay v. Wa it, 191.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES. See DAMAGES, 3.
1. A right to divert the water of a river, is an incorporeal hereditament,
and can pass only by instrument under seal. eghte v. The Raritan Water
Power Co., 191.
2. A party will be liable for injury resulting from neglect to keep a ditch
in repair, which passes through another's land. Richardson v. Kier, 192.
3. A party is bound to use as great care in managing his ditch, to avoid
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injury to another, as a prudent person would, were the property exposed his
own. Campbell v. B. R. J- A. IV. Co., 503.
4. The value of a water ditch is its capacity, and the market value of water
in the vicinity. Clark v. 
Willett, 504.
WILL. See CHARITABL USES; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 2.
1. If a will direct executors to sell a certain tract after the death of a cer-
tain legatee, and contains no other power of sale, a sale in the lifetime of
such legatee is void. Booraem v. Wells, 127.
2. A power of appointment given by will, to devise certain property among
such benevolent, religious, or charitable institutions as may be deemed pro-
per, is void, as being too vague and indefinite. Norris v. 7nompson's Ex'rs,
245.
3. Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body
will disqualify a person from making a will, if sufficient intelligence remain,
and such person is free from unlawful influence. Hi.qgins v. Carlton, 255.
4. Although a will may be ineffectual to pass land in another state, because
not attested by subscribing witnesses, yet an heir nt law to whom a legacy is
given from the testator's Pennsylvania estate, the will being valid in this
state, will be put to his election, and will not be permitted to claim the. gift
without giving assent to everything contained in the instrument. Van Dyke
v. Van Dyke, 462.
5. The English rule that cases in which a legacy is given upon the express
condition that the legatee shall give up his claim to real estate, are distinguish-
able from those in which it is clearly implied, rests upon no sufficient reason
and cannot be satisfactorily explained. Id.
6. The doctrine of equitable election is grounded upon the ascertained inten-
tion of the testator. Id.
7. Equitable election rests upon the principle of compensation ; and not
of forfeiture, which applies only to the non-performance of an express condi-
tion. Id.
8. Courts of equity in Pennsylvania have jurisdiction in cases of election
on the ground of trust; although the case arises under a will, and bears inci-
dentally upon the settlement of a decedent's estate. The jurisdiction of the
Orphans' Court is concurrent, but not exclusive. Id.
9. A copy may under certain circumstances be proved as the will of a de-
ceased person. Dudley v. Wardner, 511.
10. No particular language is. necessary to create a charge on land; the
intention to charge is to be carried out whenever it is discoverable from any-
thing in the instrument. Okeson's Appeal, 703.
11. A conveyance of land, in trust to pay the proceeds to the grantor for
life, then to his wife for life, and after the death of both, to be sold, and cer-
tain specified sums to be paid to grantor's children, is not in the nature of a
will and cannot be revoked. Bitter's Appeal, 704.
12. The following instrument: "I wish five thousand dollars to go to John
C. Cole in the event of my dying intestate, and the balance of my property
to go to Robert Beatie, to be disposed of by him as his judgment may dictate,"
if properly executed and witnessed, is testamentary in its character, and is a
will. Estate of Wood, 704.
WITNiESS. See CRI.INAL LAw, 3.
1. Objection to witness on ground of incompetency by reason of interest,
must be made in time for other party to remove it if possible, or to supply the
want by other testimony. Graham v. Berryman, 128.
2. The Act of 1864, ch. 280 Maine, allowing a person charged with crime
to be called as a witness at the trial "at his own request, but not otherwise,"
is constitutional. State v. Bartlett, 184.
3. The opinion of a witness as to waste committed by a tenant for life, is
not admissible in evidence. Woodward v. Gates, 319.
4. Not a resident of this state, is entitled to mileage for the whole distance




5. An interested witness cannot be offered to purge himself of his interest
by his own voire dire. Coal Co. v. Foster, 368.
6. The wife of a minor's next friend, is a competent witness for the ad.
ministrator, who has been substituted, after suit brought by the next friend.'
Taylor v. Grand Trunk R., 571.
7. The testimony of a physician is admissible although his knowledge is
derived from study alone. Id.
8. Party to a suit, not allowed to testify, when adversary is executor or
administrator. Brown v. Brown, 576.
9. The rule is not universal that a witness must state facts and not opinions.
Town of Cavendish v. Troy, 639.
10. Death of one party to cause of action, is ground for excluding the survi-
vor from testifying. Hollister, Adm. of Barrows, v. Young, 639.
II. A witness who was a lawyer being under examination was questioned
touching a certain conveyance made to him by the bankrupt and wife and a
subsequent conveyance by him to the wife, and refused to testify thereon as
matter within the privilege of confidential communications between attorney
and client. Held, on the facts stated the questions were proper and must
be answered, and are not within such privilege. In Re Bellis, 747.
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